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In the past several years, many states' financial condition has been so precarious
that some observers have predicted that one or more might default. As the crisis persisted,
a very unlikely word crept into these conversations: bankruptcy. Should Congress
provide a bankruptcy option for states, or would bankruptcy be a mistake? The goal of
this Article is to carefully vet this question, using all of the theoretical, empirical, and
historical tools currently available. The discussion is structured as a "case" for
bankruptcy rather than an "on the one hand, on the other hand" assessment. But it seeks
to be scrupulously fair and reaches several conclusions that veterans of the public and
scholarly debate may find surprising.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly develops the theoretical basis for state
bankruptcy. Part 11 explores each of six key benefits of a state-bankruptcy regime. Part
III then turns to six principal objections, considering each in detail. After analyzing the
response to New York City's 1975 crisis and a number of states' enactment of municipal-
oversight boards, Part IV focuses on the possibility of an analogous federal oversight
alternative to a more general bankruptcy statute. Although bankruptcy seems superior
overall, the oversight strategy would offer some of the same benefits if Congress failed to
enact a bankruptcy law before a state crisis materialized.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early decades of the Republic, the prospect of an
American state defaulting on its obligations was a real and present
threat. After the Panic of 1837, and again after the Civil War, states
did just that.' So notorious were the states that they were lampooned
in fiction and verse. To Scrooge, the tightfisted hero of Charles
Dickens's A Christmas Carol, bills of exchange for which the
payment has been delayed were like "a mere United States
security."' William Wordsworth devoted an entire sonnet to this
theme. "All who revere the memory of Penn," the speaker of "To
the Pennsylvanians" concludes,
Grieve for the land on whose wild woods his name
Was fondly grafted with a virtuous aim,
Renounced, abandoned by degenerate Men
For state-dishonour black as ever came
To upper air from Mammon's loathsome den.'
The story of these defaults and the bondholders' efforts to collect is told in John Orth's
delightful doctrinal history of state sovereign immunity. John V. Orth, The Judicial Power of
the United States: The Eleventh Amendment in American History 3-5 (Oxford 1987).
2 Charles Dickens, A Christmas Carol 36 (Crowell 1924) (expressing Scrooge's great
relief that night had not permanently taken possession of the world, as time-sensitive bills of
exchange would be as worthless as US securities "if there were no days to count by"). For a
brief discussion of this quote, see Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States at 3 (cited in
note 1).
3 William Wordsworth, "To the Pennsylvanians" (1845), in 8 The Poetical Works of
William Wordsworth 164,164 (William Paterson 1885) (William Knight, ed).
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The offense? Pennsylvania's default on its state debt in 1841.'
Until recently, these episodes seemed like relics from a
primordial time. The nineteenth-century state defaults that aroused
such ire occurred before American markets and industry were fully
developed, and many were linked to the peculiar circumstances of
the Civil War and its aftermath.' In the twentieth century, only a
single state defaulted on its debt,6 and few others threatened to
follow suit.'
In the past several years, however, the possibility of a state
default has begun to look a little less imaginary. Projecting a
$25 billion deficit last year, California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger proposed to sell the San Francisco Civic Center and
other state properties to raise funds.' Facing its own large deficit and
enormous shortfalls in its public employee pensions, Illinois passed a
major tax increase Both states remain in precarious financial
condition, and they have plenty of company."0
As the crisis persisted, a very unlikely word crept into
conversations about the states' financial predicament: bankruptcy.
Starting in late 2010, a few politicians and commentators insisted that
state bankruptcy was an idea whose time had now come." So long as
the statute was entirely voluntary and did not interfere with
governmental decision making, they proposed, it should satisfy any
4 See Michael Waibel, Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals 3-4
(Cambridge 2011).
5 See, for example, Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States at 5 (cited in note 1).
6 Arkansas defaulted during the Great Depression. See Monica Davey, The State That
Went Bust, NY Times WK3 (Jan 23, 2011) (analyzing Arkansas's 1933 default).
7 Probably the last serious discussion of possible state default prior to the recent
financial crisis came during New York City's crisis in 1975. Many thought that if New York
City collapsed, the state might also default on its obligations. The New York crisis is discussed
in Part IV.B.
8 See, for example, Elizabeth Lesly Stevens, States Poised to Sell Trophy Buildings to
Unidentified Investors, NY Times A33A (Dec 26, 2010) (projecting sale of state office
complexes to raise $1.3 billion). Governor Jerry Brown later canceled the sales. See Shane
Goldmacher, State's Sale of Buildings is Canceled; Brown Says the Deal, Meant to Help Plug the
Budget Gap, Would Have Been Far Too Costly in the Long Run, LA Times AA1 (Feb 10,
2011).
9 See Monica Davey, Questions Persisting as Illinois Raises Taxes, NY Times A16
(Jan 13, 2011).
10 See Dave McKinney, Watchdog Group: State Deficit to Grow to $5 Billion, Chi Sun-
Times 26 (Sept 26, 2011); Adam Nagourney, Budget Crisis Is Worse, California Legislators Are
Told, NY Times A29 (Dec 9, 2010).
11 See, for example, Jeb Bush and Newt Gingrich, Better Off Bankrupt: States Should
Have the Option of Bankruptcy Protection to Deal with Their Budget Crises, LA Times A19
(Jan 27, 2011); David Skeel, Give States a Way to Go Bankrupt, Weekly Standard 11 (Nov 29,
2010); David Skeel, A Bankruptcy Law-Not Bailouts-for the States, Wall St J A17 (Jan 18,
2011).
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constitutional concerns. After all, municipal bankruptcy has long
been deemed constitutional if it satisfies these criteria and gives
states the power to forbid their municipalities from invoking the
law. 2 Advocates argued that bankruptcy would be preferable to
either a complete default or a federal bailout, the two existing
options in the event a state's financial distress spiraled out of
control.3
Not everyone agreed. The Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities rushed out a report contending that the crisis was largely
just a short-term problem caused by cities' and states' loss of revenue
due to the Great Recession. While "states and localities are
struggling to maintain needed services," its authors argued, "this is a
cyclical problem that ultimately will ease as the economy recovers.""
A representative of the National Governors Association warned the
Senate Budget Committee that "no governor or state is requesting
this [ ] authority, and it is also true that such authority will likely
increase interest rates, raise the cost of state government, and create
more volatility in the financial markets."5
Should Congress provide a bankruptcy option for states, or is
the idea misguided? The goal of this Article is to carefully vet this
question, using all of the theoretical, empirical, and historical tools
currently available. The discussion is structured as a "case" for
bankruptcy rather than an "on the one hand, on the other hand"
assessment. But I will be as scrupulously fair as I can, reaching
several conclusions that veterans of the public and scholarly debate
may find surprising-such as a conclusion that an ad hoc
restructuring similar to the approach used for New York City in 1975
is a plausible though imperfect alternative to a prespecified
bankruptcy framework.
Many people recoil at the word "bankruptcy," especially in this
context. It is tempting to use a different term, such as a "state debt
12 See United States v Bekins, 304 US 27, 51-54 (1938). Because cities and other
municipalities are subdivisions of a state, federal bankruptcy of a municipality raises the same
issues as bankruptcy of a state. Municipal bankruptcy is currently housed in Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 USC § 901 et seq.
13 See, for example, Skeel, A Bankruptcy Law at A17 (cited in note 11); Bush and
Gingrich, Better Off Bankrupt at A19 (cited in note 11).
14 Iris J. Lav and Elizabeth McNichol, Misunderstandings Regarding State Debt, Pensions,
and Retiree Health Costs Create Unnecessary Alarm 1 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities Jan
20, 2011), online at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3372 (visited Nov 26, 2011).
15 See Barrie Tabin Berger, Telling the Truth about State and Local Finance, 27 Gov Fin
Rev 79, 80 (Apr 2011), quoting Senate Budget Committee, The Fiscal Situation 9 (Feb 3, 2011),
online at http://budget.senate.gov/democratic/index.cfm/files/serve?File-id=e3f68489-487f-
4489-98e6-8e6lfa20cae8 (visited Nov 24, 2011).
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adjustment framework," to sidestep the negative associations."
Altering the terminology also would highlight the distinction
between state bankruptcy and other, more familiar forms of
bankruptcy; and it might counteract the tendency to envision
bankruptcy in monolithic terms, as a single framework rather than a
wide range of possible restructuring mechanisms. Despite these
benefits, I will use "bankruptcy" throughout the Article. In addition
to its familiarity, "bankruptcy" has the added virtue of being the
language employed by the US Constitution."
My embrace of the traditional term begs the question of just
what bankruptcy is. The Supreme Court has never fully defined its
scope, and commentators rarely stop to examine its contours." In its
most important early case, Sturges v Crowninshield," the Court made
clear that the Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress the power to
marshal some or all of the debtor's assets to pay its creditors, and to
discharge some or all of the debtor's obligations.' Interestingly, the
Court did not state in this case, and has never explicitly held since,
that insolvency is a prerequisite for bankruptcy. Over time,
bankruptcy has come to include nearly any reasonably
comprehensive framework for adjusting a debtor's obligations,
devoting some or all of a debtor's available assets (if any) to
repayment of creditors, and giving the debtor a discharge.2' A law
16 One cannot be sure that the stratagem would work, however. Chapter 9's official title
is "Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality," but it is universally known as municipal
bankruptcy. See 11 USC § 901 et seq.
17 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 4 gives Congress the power "to establish ... uniform Laws on
the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States."
18 Even experts sometime trip themselves up on the terminology. Bankruptcy lawyer
James Spiotto condemned the idea of bankruptcy for states at the outset of his 2011 legislative
testimony as a mistake that "would create practical problems and face legal obstacles," for
instance, but then went on to propose that Congress consider adopting a framework similar to
the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) proposed for sovereign debt in the early 2000s. Role of Public Employee Pensions in
Contributing to State Insolvency and the Possibility of a State Bankruptcy Chapter, Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial, and Administrative Law of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 112th Cong, 1st Sess 57, 69 (2011) (prepared statement of James
Spiotto) ("State Insolvency Hearings"). By any ordinary definition of bankruptcy, the SDRM
is a bankruptcy framework.
19 17 US (4 Wheat) 122 (1819).
20 Id at 192-96. In Sturges, the Court defined bankruptcy to include both bankruptcy
laws, which historically had discharged the debtors after their assets were distributed to
creditors, and insolvency laws, which released a debtor from prison. Id.
21 For a short and still useful discussion of the Supreme Court's expanding interpretation
of the Bankruptcy Clause, see Frank R. Kennedy, Bankruptcy and the Constitution, in
Blessings of Liberty 131, 137-38 (ALI/ABI 1988) (characterizing the caselaw as "com[ing]
close to permitting Congress complete freedom in formulating and enacting bankruptcy
legislation"). For the most complete treatment of Congress's bankruptcy authority, see
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authorizing the restructuring of one class of creditors or imposing a
moratorium on creditors' rights therefore is not a bankruptcy law.
When I speak of state bankruptcy, I thus have a more
comprehensive framework in mind.
Although Congress can enact related provisions-such as a
moratorium on debt repayment-under its Commerce Clause
powers, the question whether a particular law is or is not a
"bankruptcy" law is not simply playing with words. Laws that alter
the parties' nonbankruptcy entitlements are likely to be subject to
more searching scrutiny under the Contracts and Takings Clauses of
the Constitution, for instance, if they are not enacted under the
Bankruptcy Clause.2 The Supreme Court has also given Congress
more flexibility to "pierce" state sovereign immunity under the
Bankruptcy Clause than the Commerce Clause.' My focus
throughout the Article will be on a framework that is sufficiently
comprehensive to constitute a true bankruptcy law.'
Because the concept of state bankruptcy is so novel, I will start
at the beginning by showing how state bankruptcy might be justified
in theoretical terms. For the past three decades, most American
bankruptcy scholars have understood bankruptcy as a response to
collective action problems, thanks to pioneering work by Douglas
Baird and Thomas Jackson.' Because creditors cannot effectively
coordinate, the reasoning goes, they might dismember an otherwise
viable firm as each creditor rushed to collect if bankruptcy did not
put a halt to these individual collection efforts.6 This rationale is a
weak fit for states, because it is quite difficult for creditors to coerce
Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83
Notre Dame L Rev 605, 612-614 (2008).
22 See, for example, James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in
Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy
Clause, 96 Harv L Rev 973, 997-98 (1983).
23 See, for example, Central Virginia Community College, v Katz, 546 US 356, 378 (2006).
24 In other work, I have outlined the terms of such a law in more technical detail. David
A. Skeel Jr, State Bankruptcy from the Ground Up, in Peter Conti-Brown and David A. Skeel
Jr, eds, When States Go Broke: Origins, Context, and Solutions for the American States in Fiscal
Crisis *4-8 (forthcoming Cambridge 2012).
25 See, for example, Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-bankruptcy Entitlements, and
the Creditors' Bargain, 91 Yale L J 857, 859-71(1982); Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H.
Jackson, Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on
Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U Chi L Rev 97, 106 (1984).
26 Jackson, 91 Yale L J at 862 (cited in note 25).
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payment from a state. 7 Whatever collective action problems a state
faces are quite limited.
To understand the logic of state bankruptcy we need to change
categories. The relevant analogy is not corporate bankruptcy so
much as personal bankruptcy.' States are like people. When they
find themselves in an insoluble financial predicanient, it is often
because of systematic distortions in their decision making. Both state
politicians and individuals tend to overweight the present and pay
insufficient attention to potential future consequences. 9 As with a
person, and unlike with a corporation, the decision maker cannot be
displaced in bankruptcy. Instead, bankruptcy can restructure an
unsustainable debt load that would otherwise have left both the
debtor and its creditors worse off. Seen from this perspective, state
bankruptcy looks quite different than is commonly assumed.
Having laid the theoretical groundwork, I outline six potential
benefits of state bankruptcy, ranging from several that apply even
outside bankruptcy-such as increased leverage to restructure a
state's obligations-to others that would arise only if the bankruptcy
option were invoked. By reducing subsidies for borrowing, among
other things, bankruptcy would counteract state politicians'
incentives to ignore the long-term costs of fiscal profligacy. It also
would assure a more equitable distribution of the pain of financial
crisis. Current ad hoc approaches, such as recent reforms in
Wisconsin, Ohio, and other states," usually visit the sacrifice on one
or two constituencies -often state employees and the recipients of
social services. Bankruptcy would bring a broader range of
constituencies to the restructuring table.
Although state bankruptcy's benefits are considerable, critics
have raised a number of plausible objections, some of which require
careful attention. Two of the most powerful are (1) that states
27 A state is protected from most creditor litigation by sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. See US Const Amend XI. See, for example, Magnolia Venture Capital
Corp v Prudential Securities, Inc, 151 F3d 439, 443 (5th Cir 1998).
28 1 am not the first to observe that sovereigns are similar to individuals for bankruptcy
purposes. For a version of this argument in the sovereign debt context, see Robert K.
Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 Emory L
J 1159, 1163-64 (2004).
29 The decision-making biases of individuals and states are not identical, of course. They
differ in that miscalculation figures prominently with individuals, whereas politicians have an
incentive to frontload benefits even if they are fully aware of the implications for the future
because they are not likely to be the ones who will bear the future costs. See Clayton P.
Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 Denver U L Rev 1241, 1256 (2009).
30 See, for example, Monica Davey and Richard A. Oppel Jr, Wisconsin Budget Would
Slash School and Municipal Aid, NY Times A16 (Mar 2, 2011); Amy Merrick and Kris Maher,
Ohio Governor Poses Steep Budget Cuts, Wall St J A4 (Mar 16, 2011).
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already have adequate tools to address their financial distress, as
evidenced by the measures that have been taken in Wisconsin and
other states, and (2) that bankruptcy might create contagion in the
bond markets, making it difficult for even fiscally responsible states
to borrow money. In each case, I show that the objections are less
compelling than they initially appear. The likelihood that most states
can muddle through does not justify ignoring the very low
probability of a catastrophic failure. And the empirical evidence on
bond market contagion suggests that fears of a state bond crisis are
greatly overstated. Indeed, they echo the dire warnings that were
made when municipal bankruptcy was first proposed in the 1930s, as
well as the claims that are regularly made by creditors facing
regulation.'
Traditional bankruptcy is not the only option for restructuring a
state's finances in the event of catastrophic financial distress. In the
final part of the Article, I consider an important alternative. In 1975,
as New York City fell into financial distress, New York State put a
financial control board and other reforms in place and Congress
provided $2.3 billion in loan guarantees. A number of other states
have subsequently enacted legislation authorizing intervention by a
municipal-control board to oversee financially troubled cities.
Although Congress has much less authority over states than states
have over their municipalities due to federalism constraints,
lawmakers could implement a similar approach so long as the state
agreed to the intervention in return for federal funding. This is the
model Congress used with New York City, and it is a familiar feature
of programs such as Medicaid and welfare. There are a variety of
risks to this approach, as with any resolution that is not prespecified,
but it is not altogether implausible. To explore these points and
complete the analysis of state bankruptcy, I consider the strategic
incentives of Congress and a troubled state that seeks federal
support under each scenario.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly develops the
theoretical basis for state bankruptcy. In Part II, I explore each of
the six key benefits of a state-bankruptcy regime. I then turn in Part
III to six principal objections, considering each in detail. Part IV
31 When the first municipal bankruptcy law was enacted in 1934, critics claimed that
"'the very novelty of the thing will adversely affect the municipal bond market' and 'would act
as a drag on the sale of municipal securities and might demand a higher rate of interest on such
securities."' Jonathan S. Henes and Stephen E. Hessler, Deja Vu, All over Again, 245 NY L J
S6 (June 27, 2011), quoting Amend the Bankruptcy Act-Municipal Indebtedness, HR Rep No
207, 73d Cong, 2d Sess 4, 6 (1933) (minority views) and To Amend the Bankruptcy Act-
Municipal Indebtedness, S Rep No 407, 73d Cong, 2d Sess 4, 4 (1934) (minority views).
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focuses on the Federal Oversight Board alternative to a more
general bankruptcy statute. I briefly summarize the analysis in the
Conclusion.
I. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION(S)
We begin with bankruptcy theory-and an apparent
conundrum. According to its usual theoretical justification,
bankruptcy solves a collective action problem.2 Even if a troubled
business is worth more as a going concern, a destructive "grab race"
that forces liquidation may nevertheless ensue if the company falls
into financial distress.3 It is rational for a creditor to grab assets, even
if this may cause an inefficient liquidation, because the creditor will
be even worse off if it refrains but other creditors do not.' By putting
a halt to collection activities and providing a collective forum for
resolving the company's financial distress, bankruptcy solves this
conflict between the incentives of individual creditors, on the one
hand, and the collective good, on the other. 5 The contemporary
finance literature makes the point in a slightly different way:
bankruptcy is justified because creditors may insist on tough
contractual terms that may force an inefficient liquidation if the
debtor is in financial distress.'
The conundrum is this: if bankruptcy's signal benefit is avoiding
an inefficient and ill-advised liquidation, as these theories suggest,
then the rationale does not apply to states. Thanks to sovereign
immunity, states do not face the same risk of liquidation as
corporations. If California or Illinois defaults, its creditors cannot
32 Jackson, 91 Yale L J at 859-71 (cited in note 25); Baird and Jackson, 51 U Chi L Rev
at 106 (cited in note 25).
33 The danger of a "race to the courthouse" was already a theme in bankruptcy
discussions in the late nineteenth century, but Jackson was the first to incorporate it into a
general theory of bankruptcy. See Davis v Schwartz, 155 US 631, 636 (1895).
34 See, for example, Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 10
(Harvard 1986) ("The basic problem that bankruptcy law is designed to handle, both as a
normative matter and as a positive matter, is that the system of individual creditor remedies
may be bad for the creditors as a group when there are not enough assets to go around.").
35 Subsequent scholars questioned the scope of the collective action problem, see, for
example, Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U Chi L
Rev 645, 678-79 (1992) (arguing that collective action problems can be removed by nimble use
of security interests), and proposed a variety of alternatives to the reorganization provisions in
Chapter 11, see, for example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations, 101 Harv L Rev 775, 785 (1988). These debates are tangential to the present
discussion, other than to underscore that collective action problems are not the only rationale
for bankruptcy.
36 See, for example, Javier Suarez and Oren Sussman, Financial Distress, Bankruptcy
Law and the Business Cycle, 3 Annals Fin 5, 6-7 (2007).
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seize the capitol building in Sacramento or Springfield, or take over
state property in the Sierra Nevadas 7 We should not get carried
away with this point. A state's response to financial distress can look
a lot like a liquidation. California was poised to sell $1.3 billion of its
public properties until Governor Jerry Brown called the sales off.'
Many states have cut back sharply on public libraries and social
programs." These cuts may destroy synergies-such as the networks
developed in connection with an antipoverty or prison-release
program-in ways that echo, at least loosely, the inefficient
liquidation of a business.
The obvious distinction between the measures just noted and
the grab race of traditional bankruptcy lore is that the states, not
their creditors, determine which assets will be sold and which
programs cut. A state's creditors have far less ability to seize state
assets themselves than the creditors of a private business. Unlike
most sovereign debtors, states apparently do not generally waive
their sovereign immunity when they issue bonds, and even if they
did, it still would be very difficult to pursue the state or its assets in
court in the event of a default.' While creditors are not altogether
bereft of collection options, they cannot march into court, obtain a
judgment, and seize assets in the same way as the creditors of a
private corporation. The Eleventh Amendment prevents creditors
from suing a state in federal court. Although a creditor could
sidestep this obstacle by suing an officer of the state in her personal
capacity, the creditor would not be entitled to damages if the funds
would come from the state treasury, and the officer could evade a
mandamus action seeking to compel performance of the contract by
simply resigning." Given the obstacles to collection, the most familiar
37 See US Con st Amend XI. Theoretically, creditors do have remedies in some
circumstances. But these remedies generally can be evaded, as discussed below.
38 See note 8 and accompanying text.
39 See, for example, Michael Kelley, In California, All State Funding for Public Libraries
Remains in Jeopardy, Library J (July 5, 2011), online at http://www.libraryjournal.com/lj/home
/891201-264/incalifornia-all-statejfunding.html.csp (visited Nov 26, 2011); Michael Kelley
and Lynn Blumenstein, Newsdesk, Library J (Mar 15, 2011), online at
http://www.ibraryjournal.comlljfljinprintcurrentissue/890115-403/newsdesk-may-15
_2011.html.csp (visited Nov 24, 2011); Erik Eckholm, States Slashing Social Programs For
Vulnerable, NY Times Al (Apr 12, 2009).
40 See, for example, Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State 'Bankruptcy,' 59
UCLA L Rev 322, 344 n 68 (2011) ("A review of randomly selected state bond indentures and
state statutes revealed no effective waivers by states of sovereign immunity in federal court.").
41 See, for example, Robert S. Amdursky and Clayton P. Gillette, Municipal Debt Finance
Law: Theory and Practice § 5.4.1 (Little, Brown 1992) (describing states' and municipalities'
ability to evade even mandamus actions). See also City of Grass Valley v Walkinshaw,
212 P2d 894, 898 (Cal 1949).
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justification for bankruptcy thus does not seem to fit states especially
well.
Avoiding inefficient liquidation is not the only justification for
bankruptcy, however. The standard justification explains one key
component of bankruptcy law-the injunction against enforcement
by creditors. But bankruptcy may also be necessary to solve a debt
overhang problem."2 A debtor-whether it be an individual, a
business, or a state-may find it impossible to borrow funds, even if
it has promising future prospects, if it has a large amount of existing
debt. Unless a new lender can insist on priority status, its new loan
may be soaked up by existing obligations and thus simply subsidize
other creditors. 3 If this is the reality, the debtor won't be able to
borrow. Bankruptcy can break the impasse by enabling the debtor to
scale down its obligations so that it can fund profitable future
ventures.
Inefficient liquidation and debt overhang are not simply
interchangeable justifications for bankruptcy. Inefficient liquidation
may loom large in some contexts-as with farms or financial
institutions-while debt overhang is central with others, such as
nineteenth-century railroads." This is one reason we see different
approaches to financial distress in different countries, or with
different industries in the same country." If the liquidation option is
absent, as with a state, its very absence magnifies the significance of
debt overhang. In this sense, a state is more like an individual than a
corporation. If a corporation makes cars no one wants or books that
can be bought more cheaply elsewhere, it can simply be shut down.
Not so with a state or a person. State sovereignty and its analogue
for individuals, autonomy, imply a presumption-perhaps nearly a
42 Indeed, American corporate reorganization arguably developed as a response to
precisely this problem. For a classic article examining railroad receivership, the nation's first
corporate reorganization framework, in these terms, see Peter Tufano, Business Failure,
Judicial Intervention, and Financial Innovation: Restructuring U.S. Railroads in the Nineteenth
Century, 71 Bus Hist Rev 1, 8-9 (1997).
43 The classic analysis is Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J Fin
Econ 147, 154 (1977).
44 Inefficient liquidation was less likely with nineteenth-century railroads than with other
businesses because every constituency agreed that railroads were worth more as ongoing
enterprises than in liquidation. See, for example, David A. Skeel Jr, Debt's Dominion: A
History of Bankruptcy Law in America 60-63 (Princeton 2001) (identifying this as one of the
major factors that spurred the creation of railroad receivership).
45 See David A. Skeel Jr, The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency
Regulation, 76 Tex L Rev 723, 725 (1998) (contrasting procedures used to resolve bank and
insurance company insolvencies to corporate reorganization under Chapter 11).
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conclusive one-that debt overhang problems must be solved in
order to free up the debtor's future prospects.'
Debt overhang obviously does not arise quite so easily and
irreversibly in states as with an individual. Because states, unlike
individuals, have evergreen sources of income, thanks to taxes and
other revenues, they may be able to handle debt burdens that
initially appear to be oppressive." But a state's capacity to tax is not
infinite. Residents can evade high tax burdens by moving to another
state, and residents may be tempted to avoid oppressive tax rates
illegally." The history of state financial crises in the past," and the
more recent analogue in countries' financial crises, show that debt
overhang is a real issue and can have devastating consequences
unless it is relieved.'
States are like individuals in another respect as well. In each
case, systemic decision-making biases often figure prominently in the
debtor's financial distress. More surprising still, the nature of the
dysfunction is quite similar. Consumer debtors tend to underestimate
the likelihood and magnitude of future costs;5' politicians have strong
incentives to spend in the present and push their repayment to the
future. 2 At first glance, bankruptcy does not seem to address either
problem. Unlike a corporate bankruptcy, which shifts decision-
making authority from a firm's shareholders to its creditors and
often leads to changes in management,53 personal bankruptcy does
46 This is true even though "contracts in general and debt contracts in particular define
only a sliver of any state's constituents," as Anna Gelpern argues. Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy,
Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 Yale L J 888, 907 (2012).
47 See, for example, Conor Dougherty, Higher Taxes Lift State Collections, Wall St J A4
(June 29, 2011) (suggesting that an increase in tax revenues has counteracted state fiscal crisis
to some extent).
48 See, for example, Andrew Haughwout, et al, Local Revenue Hills: Evidence from Four
U.S. Cities, 86 Rev Econ & Stat 570, 570-71 (2004).
49 See, for example, Waibel, Sovereign Defaults at 3-4 (cited in note 4).
50 Greece is the obvious current example. As I initially wrote these words, there were
photos on the front pages of the major newspapers of Athens streets engulfed in flames as
protesters rioted in response to proposed austerity measures demanded by Europe and the
International Monetary Fund. See, for example, Alkman Granitsas, Greece Erupts over
Austerity, Wall St J Al (June 29, 2011) (reporting violent protests and general strikes in
response to parliamentary debate on $40 billion in austerity measures).
51 Tom Jackson was the first to identify decision-making biases as a key reason for
personal bankruptcy. Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv
L Rev 1393, 1404-05 (1985) (arguing that consumers "systematically fail to pursue their own
long-term interests when making decisions").
52 See Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule at 1256 (cited at note 29).
53 For an examination of creditors' enhanced role in corporate governance following
bankruptcy, see David A. Skeel Jr, Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 Yale L J 1519, 1552-58
(2004) (identifying shift in control rights as a major function of corporate bankruptcy).
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not and state bankruptcy would not directly remove the
dysfunctional decision maker. As we shall see, however, bankruptcy
serves as a corrective in two related respects: it gives the debtor's
creditors an incentive to counteract the debtor's decision-making
biases; and it provides insurance against the consequences of
decision-making biases by addressing the debt overhang the biases
can produce.'
II. WHAT DOES STATE BANKRUPTCY OFFER?
The discussion thus far has identified the reduction of debt
overhang as the principal justification for a bankruptcy framework
for states, and its effect on dysfunctional decision making as a related
but distinct justification. It has also relied on an unlikely analogy: the
similarity between states and consumer debtors. In this Part, I move
from the general to the specific, exploring the specific benefits that a
restructuring framework might offer. Perhaps most remarkably,
several of these benefits would come into play even if no state ever
took the bankruptcy plunge. I discuss six major benefits in all,
moving in roughly chronological sequence from those that would
accrue outside bankruptcy to those that arise in bankruptcy itself.
A. The Shadow of a State-Bankruptcy Law
The first benefit is that a restructuring framework would have a
feedback effect, increasing the state's leverage even outside
bankruptcy. If the state could more easily restructure its collective
bargaining agreements with unionized employees in bankruptcy, for
instance, the threat of bankruptcy would shape the parties'
prebankruptcy negotiations. Negotiations that might prove
impossible in the absence of a bankruptcy law might become feasible
in its presence. In similar fashion, bankruptcy might make it easier to
restructure bond debt outside bankruptcy. The extent of the effect
would depend both on the terms of the bankruptcy law and the
credibility of the state's threat to invoke it. A law that gave a state
sweeping authority to restructure a particular obligation would
provide more prebankruptcy leverage than a law that imposed more
conditions. Similarly, a state-bankruptcy law would have greater
54 For a discussion of the advantages of a discharge policy in bankruptcy, see Jackson,
The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law at 249 (cited in note 34) ("[B]y providing for a right
of discharge, society enlists creditors in the effort to oversee the individual's credit decisions.").
See also Richard Hynes and Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4
Am L & Econ Rev 168,187-88 (2002) (emphasizing the insurance rationale).
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effect if it was clear that state officials would be willing to use it. But
any state-bankruptcy law that increased the state's restructuring
options would enhance the state's prebankruptcy leverage. Like
most laws, bankruptcy regulation casts a shadow.5
This shadow effect has an important and surprising implication:
it suggests that a bankruptcy law could prove beneficial even if it is
never used. In other contexts, disuse of a law is often cited as grounds
that the law is misguided or inappropriate. 6 Perhaps based on this
intuition, critics of Chapter 9, the closest analogue to state
bankruptcy, sometimes point to its sparing use, and the fact that it
has rarely been invoked by a city of any size, as evidence that it is
ineffectual. 7 Although Chapter 9 may have other shortcomings, the
dearth of major cases is not by itself evidence that the legislation has
failed. Quite to the contrary, the shadow benefit may be enormous.
Indeed, if the bankruptcy framework enabled even a few states to
address debt overhang without actually going through a bankruptcy
process, we would have ample justification for a state-bankruptcy
law.
B. Curbing Political Agency Costs
Nearly every state fiscal crisis can be traced, at least in part, to
the agency costs of political decision makers-that is, conflicts of
interest between the incentives of the decision makers and the
constituencies that they ostensibly represent. Most recently, two
related distortions have occupied much of the spotlight. The first is
lawmakers' temptation to finance current expenditures by
borrowing, which enables them to enjoy the benefits of spending
55 The "shadow" metaphor was coined in Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950, 997 (1979).
56 This intuition even has a name and doctrine: desuetude. See, for example, William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich L Rev 505, 591-94 (2001)
(describing desuetude and calling for its expanded use in criminal law).
57 See, for example, Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in
Search of a Problem, 27 Yale J Reg 351, 359 (2010) ("The chapter is in fact seldom used, and it
has almost never been used by a large and important city.").
58 The most obvious is the phalanx of barriers that must be surmounted before Chapter 9
can be invoked. See, for example, Michael W. McConnell and Randal C. Picker, When Cities
Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U Chi L Rev 425, 455-61
(1993) (describing and criticizing entry requirements such as prebankruptcy negotiation with
creditors and demonstration of insolvency).
59 Agency cost terminology originated in the economic analysis of corporate governance
as an account of the conflict of interest between corporate managers and shareholders. See
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 303, 308-09 (1976).
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while shuffling the costs off to others.' The second arises from
lawmakers' dependence on the votes of the public employees whose
pensions they establish through ostensibly arm's length bargaining
with employee representatives." Although it would not eliminate
these distortions, a state-bankruptcy framework would curb both.
Start with lawmakers' temptation to fund current spending with
borrowed funds. The price of state bonds is buoyed-and thus the
cost of borrowing for the state is reduced-by an implicit promise
that bondholders will be bailed out if a state falls into financial
distress.' By decreasing the cost of borrowing, this subsidy increases
the allure of credit, thus exacerbating the temptation to use bond
financing. By providing a mechanism for restructuring a state's bond
obligations in the event of a crisis, bankruptcy would trim this
subsidy. If bankruptcy reduced the pressure for a federal bailout, as
it likely would,' it would assure that the price of bonds more
accurately reflected their true social cost, and it would give
bondholders an incentive to monitor the state's financial condition.
Lawmakers would still be tempted to borrow funds for current
spending, but they (and thus the state) would pay a higher price for
doing so.
The second distortion-states' pension obligations-is the single
greatest threat to states' fiscal stability. Many states have made
implausibly generous pension commitments to their employees, and
state pension funds are radically underfunded-by roughly $3
trillion, according to some recent estimates.' Political agency costs
are a prominent cause of the pension crisis. The lawmakers who
60 See Gillette, 86 Denver U L Rev at 1256 (cited in note 29) (describing the "incentive
to utilize too much debt and to impose a temporal externality on future residents").
61 See, for example, Richard Epstein, The Wisconsin Shoot Out on Public Unions,
Defining Ideas (Hoover Institution Feb 22, 2011), online at
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/67771 (visited Nov 25, 2011).
62 This is similar to the subsidy that bondholders of Citigroup and Bank of America
enjoyed in 2008, due to the widespread (correct, as it turned out) assumption the institutions
would be protected from default. See Dean Baker and Travis McArthur, The Value of the "Too
Big to Fail" Big Bank Subsidy, Issue Brief 2 (Center for Economic and Policy Research Sept
2009).
63 Clay Gillette has argued that the existence of a bankruptcy law could actually be used
as a leverage by the state to secure a bailout. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism,
Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U Chi L Rev 281, 302-08 (2011)
(noting that contagion effects of state defaults would lead federal government to favor bailouts
over bankruptcy). Although Gillette's point about the strategic possibilities is an important
one, a state's ability to threaten to simply default already gives the state considerable leverage.
Bankruptcy seems likely to decrease pressure for a bailout overall, as discussed later in this
Article.
64 The high-end $3 trillion estimate comes from Robert Novy-Max and Joshua D. Rauh,
The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension Plans, 23 J Econ Persp 191, 204 (2009).
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negotiate a state's pension promises with the state's employee unions
often depend on the votes of those same employees for election, and
they may be beneficiaries of the same (or in some cases, even more
generous) state pension framework.' As a result, bargaining over
pensions looks very different than true arm's length bargaining.
Because pension accounting is complex, and it is difficult to predict
how much the pensions will eventually cost, lawmakers also are
tempted to skimp, and do skimp, on the amounts they set aside for
future pension payments.' Indeed, failing to adequately fund the
state's pension has become lawmakers' primary means of
circumventing state laws that ostensibly require them to balance the
budget each year. "[J]ust as companies have ways of issuing debt off
their balance sheets (think of Enron, or for that matter, Merrill
Lynch)," as Josh Rauh puts it, "states and localities have ways
around the balanced-budget rules. The most pervasive method," he
concludes, is "increasing public employees' compensation by
promising them larger pensions when they retire."' 7 By understating
these pension obligations, lawmakers can disguise a de facto deficit.'
Here, too, bankruptcy would counteract the political agency
costs that have exacerbated states' pension problems. As described
more fully below, in bankruptcy, pension beneficiaries' claims might
well be protected only up to the amount of funds actually set aside
for their payment. 9 If this is correct, unfunded pension promises
would be general unsecured claims in a bankruptcy, subject to
discharge at less than full payment. A variety of factors would affect
the actual amount of restructuring. Union representatives could use
65 According to a leading pension treatise, "In 1992 it was reported that the senior
member of the Texas state senate could retire with a pension that would exceed final salary by
660 percent. The senior Oklahoma senator was entitled to a pension benefit 172 percent of
final salary." John H. Langbein, David A. Pratt, and Susan J. Stabile, Pension and Employee
Benefit Law 105-06 (Foundation 5th ed 2010), quoting Christine Philip and Rodd Zolkos,
Legislators' Benefits Can Exceed Pay, Pensions & Investments 3 (Aug 3, 1992).
66 Much of the complexity stems from the final-average formula used in state pension
plans to determine the beneficiary's pension payout. Unless an analyst has both actuarial skill
and detailed data about the beneficiaries of the plan, she cannot make even an educated guess
about the likely liabilities under the plan.
67 Joshua Rauh, The Pension Bomb, Milken Inst Rev 26, 28 (First Quarter 2011).
68 Even the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a fervent critic of state bankruptcy,
concedes the extent of this problem in Illinois. Lav and McNichol, Misunderstanding Regarding
State Debt at 21 (cited in note 14):
Because Illinois is chronically short of the revenues it needs to cover its expenses, it has
engaged in a number of poor fiscal practices over the years. It has postponed payments to
vendors, failed to make adequate pension contributions or borrowed money to make the
contributions, securitized or sold assets, and taken other dubious actions.
69 See Part II.C.
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the uncertainty over the legal status of unfunded pension promises to
negotiate for partial protection, for instance.7 But unfunded pension
promises would be much more likely to be adjusted than they
currently are outside bankruptcy, where states often protect pension
promises without regard for whether there is any funding backing
them." The prospect of adjustment is not simply hypothetical. In the
municipal bankruptcy context, Pritchard, Alabama, restructured its
pension obligations to retired as well as current employees in
Chapter 9, and Central Falls, Rhode Island, is poised to do so.'
The threat that unsustainably generous, unfunded promises
would be cut back in bankruptcy would encourage the state
employees themselves to push for adequate funding, thus curbing the
temptation to underfund. It would not perfectly counteract the
parties' distorted bargaining incentives, of course. But at least one of
the two parties-the employee representatives themselves-would
face some of the consequences of underfunding, because they would
be blamed if the state later filed for bankruptcy and the pension was
restructured. This prospect would encourage them to consider the
sustainability of the promises, especially as a state's finances
declined. A greater emphasis on setting adequate funding aside also
would expose the true cost of excessively generous pensions, thus
putting more pressure on lawmakers to rein them in.73
Notice that these benefits, like the effect on the subsidy for
bonds, arise in the shadow of bankruptcy. They do not require that
any given state actually file for bankruptcy. The message would be
70 Bankruptcy's "best interests of the creditors" test could have a similar effect. In
Chapter 11, this provision requires that each creditor be given at least as much as they would
receive in a liquidation. See 11 USC § 1129(a)(7); Bank of America National Trust and Savings
Association v 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 526 US 434, 441-44 (1999). Because
municipalities cannot be liquidated, the provision is construed in Chapter 9 to require that
creditors receive more than they would under plausible alternatives. See 11 USC § 943(b)(7); 6
Collier on Bankruptcy § 943.03[7][a] at 943-27 (Matthew Bender 15th ed rev 2005). State
bankruptcy would (and should) include a similar provision. Under this provision, pension
beneficiaries would argue that the most plausible alternative is full payment under state law.
The logical counterargument is that the state would default in the absence of bankruptcy, and
pension beneficiaries would get no more than the pool of funds actually set aside.
71 "In practice," as one pension scholar puts it, "public-pension benefits have not been
reduced even when governments face severe fiscal distress." Andrew G. Biggs, The Market
Value of Public-Sector Pension Deficits 4 (American Enterprise Institute Apr 2010), online at
http://www.aei.org/outlook/economics/retirement/the-market-value-of-public-sectr-pensin-
deficits/ (visited Nov 26, 2011).
72 Neither case has yet given rise to a reported decision addressing the question of the
legal entitlements of the beneficiaries of underfunded pensions. For a discussion of Pritchard,
see Jeffrey B. Ellman & Daniel J. Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9: Can Municipalities Use
Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension Woes?, 27 Emory Bankr Dev J 365, 411 (2011).
73 See Novy-Max and Rauh, 23 J Econ Persp at 206 (cited in note 64).
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still stronger if a state were actually forced to adjust unrealistic
pensions in a bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy would bring another
benefit in this context as well. Most cases involving state pensions
are decided by state judges who are themselves beneficiaries of the
state's pension commitments." In bankruptcy, these decisions would
be made by a federal judge, thus assuring a more objective decision
maker, one who does not have any personal interest in the
generosity of the pension promises.
Bankruptcy isn't a cure-all. Lawmakers still would be tempted
to borrow, so that they can spend now but defer payment to later,
and the distortions in state pensions will not simply disappear. But
bankruptcy would reveal the true costs of these distortions and
would help to counteract them.
C. Establishing More Coherent Priorities
Bankruptcy also would establish a more straightforward and
coherent priority structure for state obligations. Perhaps in part
because they do not anticipate default, states do not provide
anything like a complete set of priorities for their obligations,
although many purport to create special priorities for some
obligations. Though a federal bankruptcy framework might fill in
some of the gaps, the incoherence of state priorities is a far more
pressing concern. By clarifying priorities, bankruptcy could increase
the efficiency of the credit markets, discourage destructive
borrowing, and, in doing so, lower states' borrowing costs.
To appreciate the structure of state priorities and the potential
benefit of a bankruptcy framework, consider the comparatively
robust instructions in California's Constitution.7  Under one
provision, the public school system has first call on the state's
revenues as they come in." The Constitution has also beeninterpretted to protect California's general obligation bond debt-
74 See, for example, Sidley Austin LLP, Illinois' Authority to Reduce the Pension Benefits
That Current Employees Will Earn from Future Service *1-2, 28 (Apr 27, 2010), online at
http://civiccommittee.org/initiatives/StateFinance[Final%20Pension%2Rebuttal%2OMemora
ndum 4 27 10.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2011) (arguing that judges' pensions, unlike other public
employees' pensions, are protected by state constitution and cannot be adjusted).
75 To my knowledge, Anna Gelpern was the first to draw attention to these priorities in
the legal literature. Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign
Restructurings, 53 Emory L J 1115, 1126-28 (2006) (contrasting these priorities with the
absence of priorities for sovereign nations).
76 Cal Const Art XVI, § 8(a) ("From all state revenues there shall first be set apart the
moneys to be applied by the state for support of the public school system and public
institutions of higher education.").
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that is, bonds that will be repaid from general state revenues rather
than a specific source of collateral.' Pension benefits also are singled
out for special treatment.78 Other state constitutions provide similar
although generally less detailed protections.'
Although these priorities appear to be quite straightforward,
their effect is ambiguous in two respects. The first problem is that
there is very little creditors can do if the state simply fails to pay the
obligation. If the state sets aside specific collateral or assigns a
designated source of revenue to the obligation, the priority creditor
is likely to be protected under all circumstances. But if the promise is
just a promise, it can often be subverted in a crisis. When the nation
of Ecuador fell into distress in the 1990s, for instance, it undermined
the ostensible priority of a class of sovereign bonds by targeting
those bonds for restructuring first, despite the promise that they
would be protected.' A state could subvert priorities even more
dramatically by stopping all payments on the priority obligation
while continuing to pay other creditors. This ambiguity in
priorities -which makes it very difficult for a state credibly to
commit to a priority structure in advance-stems from the state's
status as a sovereign entity, which gives it the option of simply
refusing to honor its obligations ex post."
The second ambiguity is the direct result of states' manipulation
of their finances, most evidently in their treatment of pension
obligations. Under the Illinois and New York constitutions, to give a
pair of high-profile illustrations, pension promises to public
employees cannot be altered in any way. These provisions appear
77 See State Administrative Manual (Department of General Services July 10, 2007),
online at http://sam.dgs.ca.gov/TOC/6000/6871.htm (visited Apr 11, 2012) (highlighing the
protections affording to general obligation bonds as provided by California's interpretation of
its Constitution).
78 Cal Const Art XVI, § 17.
79 In Illinois, pension benefits are singled out for special treatment under a constitutional
provision stating that "[m]embership in any pension or retirement system ... shall be an
enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or
impaired." Ill Const Art XIII, § 5.
80 Similarly, Pakistan's 2000 debt restructuring shattered the assumption that Eurobond
holders had a higher priority status than other bonds. See Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Case for
an Explicit Seniority Structure in Sovereign Debt *18-20 (IMF Working Paper, Sept 29, 2003).
81 California bondholders would have the strongest grounds for protection, but it is far
from clear that the state constitution provision promising that they will be paid before most
other obligations would prevent the bonds from being restructured. More likely, it would
require simply that payments go first to bonds, not that the principal amount of the bonds be
untouched.
82 I11 Const Art XIII, § 5; NY Const Art V, § 7. See also Jennifer Staman, State and Local
Pension Plans and Fiscal Distress: A Legal Overview 5 (Congressional Research Service Mar
31, 2011), online at http://www.nasra.org/resources/CRS%20state%20and%201ocal%201egal
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not just to protect benefits that have already been earned but also to
assure that an employee's not-yet-earned benefits will not be
reduced below their current levels, no matter how generous they
areY If Illinois set aside the funds for this promise each year, the
commitment would not be particularly problematic; it would look
like an ordinary collateralized obligation. But Illinois has dedicated
only a small portion of the funds necessary to fulfill the obligation-
51 percent, according to the most generous recent estimates.' As a
result, it is impossible to determine the true content of the guarantee.
Are pensions protected up to the full amount of the promise, are
they limited to the extent of the funding, or do they have some other
content?
A bankruptcy framework could clarify and reinforce the priority
framework in each of these areas. Start with the risk of ex post
subversion. Bankruptcy would not prevent a state from attempting a
priority-distorting restructuring outside bankruptcy. But priorities
would be honored in an actual bankruptcy, and the feedback effect
of this possibility would shape expectations even outside bankruptcy.
With the bankruptcy priorities as a backstop, creditors would have
%20framework%201104.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2011) (identifying Illinois and New York, as well
as Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, and Michigan, as states with "a constitutional provision that, in
general, explicitly provides that membership in, or accrued benefits from, a state's retirement
system creates a contract between the state and its employees that cannot be impaired").
83 The precise contours of this promise are, however, a matter of dispute. The law firm
Sidley Austin has argued that only the pension fund itself is responsible for payment; the state
has not guaranteed any shortfall. Sidley Austin, Illinois' Authority at 50-53 (cited in note 74).
For an example of the larger dispute over the legal status of Illinois pension benefits, compare
Eric M. Madiar, Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois? An Analysis of
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution 2, online at
http://www.senatedem.ilga.gov/images
/pensions/D/Pension%20Clause%2OArticle%20Final.pdf (visited Nov 26, 2011) (arguing that
the Illinois General Assembly cannot change pension benefits for current recipients), with
Sidley Austin LLP, The General Assembly's Authority to Enact Comprehensive Pension
Reform Legislation: A Response to Eric Madiar 1 (Apr 11, 2011), online at
http://www.illinoisisbroke.com /files/PensionReformMemo04llll.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2011)
(reaffirming its position that the General Assembly could reduce benefits not yet earned by
current recipients).
Several recent decisions in other states have permitted limited adjustments to existing
pensions. In both Colorado and Minnesota, courts upheld new limitations on, among other
things, cost of living adjustments. See, for example, Mary Walsh, Two Rulings Find Cuts in
Public Pensions Permissible, NY Times B1 (June 30, 2011).
84 As Doug Elliot notes, "Illinois' pensions... are only 51% funded by assets held in the
pension plans currently, even using reported figures. Using the most conservative discount
rate, the plans would only be 28% funded." Douglas J. Elliot, Potential Federal Roles in
Dealing with State and Local Pension Problems 3 (Brookings May 12, 2011). This difference
stems from the contrast between the state's own aggressive assumptions about future returns
on its assets, which are incorporated into Pew's pension reports, and the more plausible
assumptions used by Rauh. See note 67.
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more leverage to resist a restructuring that flouted their priorities." If
a state proposed to restructure one class of bonds but not another,
arguably lower-priority class of creditors, the bondholders would
have an incentive to refuse the restructuring and hold out either for a
more equitable restructuring or for bankruptcy.' The existence of a
nondiscriminatory alternative would make it appreciably more
difficult for a state to ignore creditor priorities in a crisis.
Bankruptcy's contribution to incoherent priorities, the second
problem under current law, could be even more significant. In the
absence of a bankruptcy framework, the status of schizophrenic
priorities is almost entirely speculative. Consider once again the
status of a state's unfunded pension promises in a state like Illinois
whose constitution purports to provide absolute protection for its
pension promises.' If the state continued to pay all benefits, despite
the funding shortfall, the decision could be defended as honoring the
state constitution's guaranty of pensions. If state politicians said that
continued payment was impossible, on the other hand, the outcome
of the litigation that would follow is highly uncertain, given the
conflict between the guaranty and the absence of funding to back it.
Bankruptcy would slice through this Gordian knot with two
related snips. The bankruptcy framework would fully honor (and
give highest priority to) any property right created by state law,' but
would treat other obligations as general unsecured claims that are
subject to restructuring. Because it is federal law, this determination
would trump inconsistent state law under the Supremacy Clause."
The question with unfunded pension promises is whether any or all
85 If involuntary state bankruptcy were possible, creditors would have still more leverage,
because they could threaten to throw the state into bankruptcy if it pursued a discriminatory
restructuring. But involuntary state bankruptcy would not be constitutional, as we shall see in
Part III.A.
86 If the bondholders were widely scattered, collective action problems might complicate
their coordination. But bond ownership is generally concentrated. If the state structured its
offer to punish bondholders who did not agree to the exchange offer, on the other hand,
bondholders might find it harder to resist. For discussion of these issues with corporate bonds,
see Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-Off between Individual and
Collective Rights, 77 NYU L Rev 1040, 1055-56 (2002).
87 My focus here is on benefits that existing beneficiaries already have ostensibly earned,
rather than on the question of whether the formula for benefits that have not yet been earned
by current or future employees can be altered. This issue, and states' divergent approaches, is
carefully analyzed in Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework,
5 Educ Fin & Policy 617, 643-45 (2010) (noting the different implications of contract, property
right and annuity approaches).
88 See, for example, Butner v United States, 440 US 48, 54 (1979) (holding that
bankruptcy should defer to state law treatment of property rights).
89 US Const Art VI, cl 2.
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of a state's promises creates a first priority property right for the
beneficiaries. It is quite likely that a court would conclude that
pension beneficiaries do have a property interest, but only to the
extent of the funds the state has set aside for payment. The unfunded
portions would be treated as general unsecured obligations. This is
the way other property interests are treated in bankruptcy; a secured
creditor has a secured claim up to the value of its collateral, for
instance, and an unsecured claim to the extent it is owed more than
the collateral is worth." There is a strong argument for treating
partially funded pension promises the same way. This accords, in
fact, with the historical significance of the vesting of a pension.
Vesting prevents the plan from altering or withdrawing its promise
to the beneficiary; it does not guarantee that the funds will be
available for payment. The promise rather than the payment priority
is protected."
This logic might be challenged under the US Constitution on
two grounds. First, beneficiaries might insist that limiting their
property interest to the amount of funding actually set aside violates
the Takings Clause.' Treating the remainder as an unsecured
obligation interferes with their investment backed expectations, the
reasoning would go, and is impermissible unless the beneficiaries are
fully compensated. 3 Second, the bankruptcy treatment violates the
Contracts Clause because it impairs promises made under state law.
Although the outcome is not altogether free from doubt, neither
argument is likely to unsettle the normal bankruptcy treatment. The
weakness of the Takings Clause argument lies in the facts that
property rights are ordinarily protected only up to the value of the
underlying property and that the beneficiary's investment-backed
expectations would be limited by the uncertainty as to whether the
state could make good on its unfunded promises. Given that the
treatment is consistent with the way other property rights have long
90 Under 11 USC § 506(a), which applies in both Chapter 9 and Chapter 11, property
interests are bifurcated into secured and unsecured portions. See 11 USC § 506(a); 11 USC
§ 901(a).
91 "Prior to the passage of ERISA in 1974," as one commentator puts it, "prefunding of
pension obligations was almost wholly discretionary on the part of the employer. The lack of
collateral exposed employees to the risk of default if the employer went bankrupt or
terminated the plan." Eric D. Chason, Outlawing Pension-Funding Shortfalls, 26 Va Tax Rev
519, 523 (2007) (citation omitted). The collapse of Studebaker in 1963 drew attention to the
underfunding problem and ultimately contributed to the enactment of ERISA. Id, citing John
H. Langbein and Bruce A. Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 355 (Foundation 3d ed
2000).
92 US Const Amend V.
93 Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York, 438 US 104,124 (1978).
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been treated in bankruptcy, it also does not seem likely to violate the
Contracts Clause, under the reasoning discussed earlier." If this is
correct, underfunded pensions would have a much clearer status in
bankruptcy than they do outside bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy would have a clarifying effect on other state
obligations as well. Many state obligations-or ostensible
obligations -consist of promises to municipalities or separate
projects that are legally distinct from the state. This proliferation of
special districts has been fueled in part by states' desire to evade
debt limits and balanced budget requirements." The result is a
complex network of obligations. Nicole Gelinas notes, for instance,
that New York "owes only $3.5 billion in 'general obligation' debt.
New York owes the remainder of its $78.4 billion in debt through
hundreds of special 'authorities,' including the Transitional Finance
Authority, Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the Dormitory
Authority, and others."' Bankruptcy has very clear principles for
sorting out these obligationsY This would enable a state to determine
the limits of its obligations in an actual bankruptcy, and the existence
of this backstop would add clarity even outside bankruptcy.
94 It is possible that a court would distinguish between state constitutional and statutory
provisions for the purposes of the Contracts Clause analysis. On this view, overriding a state
constitutional provision purporting to protect property rights would be more problematic,
since it is more difficult for a state itself to alter its constitution. But it seems more likely that a
restructuring facilitated by the Bankruptcy Clause would be upheld in either context.
95 See, for example, Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits
and State Constitutional Law, 34 Rutgers L J 907, 920-27 (2003) (describing use of special
districts and added cost this entails).
96 Hearing on State and Municipal Debt: The Coming Crisis? Before the Subcommittee on
TARP, Financial Services, and Bailouts of Public and Private Programs of the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 112th Cong 1st Sess 1-2 (2011) (statement
of Nicole Gelinas, Manhattan Institute), online at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Testimony /gelinas-testimonyedit_2MH.pdf (visited
Nov 25, 2011) ("Gelinas Statement"). Gelinas contends that the complexity in this structure
makes state bankruptcy untenable. In reality, this is exactly backwards, as argued in the text
that follows. Bankruptcy clarifies the status of otherwise uncertain obligations.
97 The general rule is that each entity is dealt with separately. Complicated cases are
often "substantively consolidated" if the creditors of the respective entities agree to the
consolidation. See, for example, William H. Widen, Report to the American Bankruptcy
Institute: Prevalence of Substantive Consolidation in Large Public Company Bankruptcies from
2000 to 2005, 16 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 1, 6, 8 (2008) (finding substantive consolidation in 178
out of 315 large public company bankruptcies investigated). The leading case is In re Owens
Corning, Inc, 419 F3d 195, 211 (3d Cir 2005) (establishing a very restrictive test for substantive
consolidation).
Recent cases like In re Worldcom, Inc, 2003 WL 23861928 (Bankr SDNY Oct 31), and In
re Enron Corp, 419 F3d 115, 119 (2d Cir 2005), have involved numerous entities, much as a
state bankruptcy would.
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A final issue stems from the fact that priorities can be created
informally by adjusting the maturity date of the repayment
obligation. Obligations that must be repaid quickly have de facto
priority, even if they are not technically entitled to priority."
Suppose, for instance, that much of a state's debt consists of bonds
that will mature in ten or fifteen years and which purport to have
priority over any subsequent bond issuances. To create de facto
priority for new debt, the state need only shorten the repayment
period. The ability to circumvent priorities has been shown both to
increase a debtor's borrowing costs and to encourage excessive
borrowing in the event of a crisis?
Here, too, bankruptcy would help. A state's ability to subvert its
existing priorities depends on its ability to credibly commit to the
new lenders that they will be repaid. Because the new obligations
would lose their de facto priority in the event of bankruptcy,
bankruptcy undermines their implicit priority." Investors would
need to consider the possibility that the state would file for
bankruptcy before repaying the short-term obligations. By
interfering with this de facto priority, bankruptcy would discourage
the destructive last-minute borrowing that sovereigns are tempted to
do in a financial crisis."'
A common theme runs through these priority issues. With each,
an actual bankruptcy filing under a bankruptcy framework would
clarify the parties' priorities and diminish the risk of subversion.
Even if the likelihood of any given state filing for bankruptcy were
remote, its existence would have a feedback effect on priorities
outside bankruptcy. Bankruptcy could not eliminate subversions of
priority altogether, of course. States still could attempt to restructure
priority obligations first or make unfunded pension promises. But
the existence of a bankruptcy alternative would shape the parties'
98 States' use of short-term, tax-anticipation notes (TANs) to raise money is a familiar
example of this phenomenon. When this borrowing is simply a temporary bridge until expected
revenues are received, it is not problematic. But it also can be used as a disguised form of
increasing the state's overall debt. See Stewart E. Sterk and Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling
Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 Wis L
Rev 1301,1314-15 (1991).
99 The effect-which is produced by the dilution of earlier debt through new
borrowing-is modeled in Patrick Bolton and Olivier Jeanne, Structuring and Restructuring
Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority, 76 Rev Econ Stud 879, 890-91 (2009).
100 This argument is developed in more detail in the sovereign debt context in Patrick
Bolton and David A. Skeel Jr, Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy
Framework Be Structured?, 53 Emory L J 763, 788-800 (2004).
101 Id at 788-93. Bankruptcy's benefits could be increased still further by adopting a true
first-in-time priority rule, under which earlier general debt has priority over subsequently
issued debt. Id at 799.
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expectations, and the contours of their expectations would more
closely track the formal, legitimate priorities.
D. Additional Restructuring Tools
Bankruptcy also might enable a state to restructure obligations
in ways that would not be possible outside bankruptcy. We saw an
important example of this benefit in the last Section: bankruptcy
provides more scope for restructuring unfunded pension obligations.
Experience in municipal bankruptcy suggests that political pressures
would limit the extent to which a state tried to scale down these
obligations."' But a state would have the legal ability to restructure
overly generous, unfunded pension obligations whose status is
ambiguous outside bankruptcy, as discussed earlier."'
The experience in the Vallejo, California, bankruptcy
underscores the benefit of several additional restructuring options."
Because of state law restrictions, Vallejo was unable to close
nonessential fire stations outside bankruptcy, and it could not
terminate its contracts with its public employee unions. 5 Bankruptcy
enabled the city to take both steps. Bankruptcy gives a debtor a great
deal of flexibility to cancel contracts that could not be adjusted
outside bankruptcy, or could be adjusted only at greater cost.
These powers are so important in ordinary corporate
bankruptcy that corporations sometimes file for bankruptcy
primarily to take advantage of the tools it makes available for
restructuring."' These same tools would significantly expand a state's
ability to restructure if its financial obligations became
unsustainable.
102 In the Vallejo bankruptcy, for instance, the city did not attempt to restructure its
pension obligations. The City concluded after discussion with its attorneys that litigation with
CalPERS over pension plan modifications for current retirees or employees would be
extremely expensive and could have taken many years. Interview with Robert V. Stout, former
financial director of the City of Vallejo and bankruptcy liaison (June 15, 2011) (on file with
author).
103 See notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
104 Vallejo filed for Chapter 9 in 2008 and has become a lightning rod for debate about
the pros and cons of Chapter 9. See generally In re City of Vallejo, 408 BR 280 (9th Cir BAP
2009).
105 See In re City of Vallejo, 403 BR 72, 79 (Bankr ED Cal 2009), affd 432 BR 262, 275-76
(ED Cal 2010).
106 The ability to terminate property leases and treat the damages as general unsecured
claims was a major reason that Kmart and many other retailers have filed for bankruptcy. See
In re Kmart Corp, 362 BR 361, 384 (Bankr ND I 2007). General Motors and Chrysler took
advantage of the same provision, 11 USC § 365(a), to terminate unwanted car dealerships. See
Lawrence A. Young, et al, Some Critical Issues in Automobile Dealer Bankruptcies, 64
Consumer Fin L Q Rep 368, 369 (2010).
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E. Equitable Distribution of Sacrifice
States do not simply stand idly by as they tumble toward
financial Armageddon, of course. They take steps to cut costs, in
some cases raise taxes, and try to restructure their obligations to
existing constituencies. This is precisely what many financially
troubled states have done during the recent crisis. Wisconsin was
particularly aggressive in this regard, renegotiating its collective
bargaining agreements with most of its public employees and passing
controversial legislation restricting future collective bargaining
rights."n Illinois, California, New York, and New Jersey have
responded to their financial plight in similar fashion.'"
There is a logic to these priorities. Like the auto industry and
airlines, many states have made implausibly generous promises to
their employees."° These costs are a major cause of states' financial
predicaments and cannot realistically be maintained at current levels.
It is both appropriate and understandable that states would take aim
at these labor and pension costs.
What is both striking and far more problematic about the states'
response to their financial predicaments, however, is that these
restructuring initiatives have not been accompanied by similarly
assiduous efforts to reduce other kinds of obligations. Two
constituencies in particular have been asked to bear a
disproportionate percentage of the sacrifice during the recent crisis:
the state's public employees and the recipients-especially the poor
and lower middle class recipients-of its services. Other, similarly
situated creditors such as bondholders have not been expected to
bear any of the financial burden.
The recent backlash against efforts to cut back on state
employees' collective bargaining rights can be explained in part as
resistance by workers and those sympathetic to them to a serious
erosion of the power they enjoyed during much of the post-World
107 For a discussion of the Wisconsin cuts and of potential constitutional objections, see
Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension Litigation *28--
48 (unpublished manuscript, Apr 2011), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id =1806018 (visited Nov 26, 2011).
108 See, for example, Vauhini Vara and Jacob Gershman, Why Cuomo Is Sailing and
Brown Becalmed- The New Governors of New York and California Have Quite a Few Things
in Common; So Far, Success Isn't One of Them, Wall St J A5 (June 30, 2011) (contrasting the
success of New York Governor Andrew Cuomo with the difficulties of California Governor
Jerry Brown in addressing their states' fiscal crises).
109 See, for example, John Hood, The States in Crisis, 6 NatI Affrs 49, 55-56 (2011), online
at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-states-in-crisis (visited Nov 26, 2011)
("High on the list of reckless expenditures and promises are unfunded government pensions.").
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War II era. But it also reflects a perception of unfairness shared by
many who would not necessarily identify themselves with labor.
Here, too, a bankruptcy framework would provide an important
benefit. Much as admiralty law's "general average" principle
requires that every constituency share the costs of measures taken in
response to a crisis during the voyage, bankruptcy requires that the
sacrifice be borne by everyone, rather than one or two disfavored
constituencies."' This does not mean that priorities can or should be
shuffled willy-nilly. To the contrary, adherence to clear priority rules
is a signal benefit of bankruptcy, as we have seen. But all general
creditors - a class that includes public employee contracts and most
bonds-can be adjusted."' Elizabeth Warren made a version of this
point in a classic article many years ago. "Bankruptcy," she argued,
is "a federal scheme designed to distribute the costs among those at
risk.""
2
The assurance of equitable treatment in bankruptcy is far from
perfect in practice. Expansive use of critical vendor doctrine, under
which debtors pay key suppliers in full, and the debtor's power to
assume some contracts while rejecting others, can lead to
distortions."' But the principle of equal treatment of similarly
situated creditors is deeply entrenched, and bankruptcy law is
designed to encourage a fair distribution of the sacrifice.
The emphasis on fairness here is important. Although
bankruptcy scholars are often hesitant to consider appeals to
fairness, it plays a major role in the politically charged context of
state and municipal finance, and its prominence is magnified still
further in a crisis. In Vallejo's Chapter 9 case, the court conditioned
its willingness to permit the city to terminate its collective bargaining
agreements on the fact that the burdens of the restructuring were
being fairly distributed among Vallejo's general creditors."' The
prospect of an equitable restructuring that requires a broad range of
constituencies to share the sacrifice is a crucially important benefit of
110 Bob Scott was the first to apply the "general average" principle to bankruptcy. See, for
example, Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors' Bargain Heuristic, 53 U Chi
L Rev 690, 700-07 (1986).
111 Even secured creditors may be subject to minor adjustments, such as the cessation of
interest payments during bankruptcy if the creditor is undercollateralized. See Thomas H.
Jackson and Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing
and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 Va L Rev 155, 178-90 (1989).
112 Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U Chi L Rev 775, 790 (1987).
113 Critical vendor treatment was questioned in In the Matter of Kmart Corporation,
359 F3d 866 (7th Cir 2004), but it has continued largely unabated. A debtor's power to assume
and reject contracts is found in 11 USC § 365(a).
114 Vallejo, 403 BR at 77-78, affd, 432 BR at 273-75.
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a bankruptcy framework, and one that has been almost completely
missed in the recent debates over states' fiscal predicament. This
objective is not always achieved in bankruptcy,' but bankruptcy is
much more likely to assure fairness than more ad hoc measures are.
F. A Better Catastrophe Option
Prior to the 2008 crisis, the largest commercial and investment
banks were earning record profits and derivatives had made the
financial markets less risky than ever before, or so it seemed."' The
"black swan"-the prospect of a complete collapse-seemed too
remote to need preparing for."' One lesson of 2008 is the danger of
ignoring seemingly unlikely but potentially devastating risks.
Consider the existing options in the unlikely-but-far-from-
impossible event that a state's financial crisis spirals out of control. A
state presently has two main possibilities if it cannot meet its
obligations."" The first is to turn to the federal government, as the
banks did when the banking system threatened to collapse in 2008.
The government could offer assistance directly- perhaps through
explicit new legislation by Congress or increases in existing outlays
such as Medicaid"-or indirectly, say, through a Federal Reserve
program to guarantee the debt of state institutions.
The normative case for extraordinary federal intervention is
extremely weak. Bailouts are most defensible if the issue is
115 The Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies are perceived by many to have been
unfair, privileging unionized employees and trade creditors while cutting off senior creditors
(in Chrysler) and current tort claimants. See, for example, Mike Spector, Car Bailouts Left
Behind Crash Victims, Wall St J Al (May 27, 2011) (describing criticisms of the failure to
provide for tort claimants).
116 See Corporate Profits by Industry, table 6.16D (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2011),
online at http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=239&Freq=Qtr
&FirstYear=2001&LastYear=2011 (visited Nov 25, 2011).
117 The popularity of the black swan metaphor in discussions of the recent financial crisis
can be traced at least in part to a popular book. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The
Impact of the Highly Improbable xvii-xviii (Random House 2007) (defining the "black swan"
as an improbable event with an extreme impact that is susceptible to the imposition of a
fictitious explanatory narrative).
118 I discuss a third possibility, a more ad hoc federal intervention modeled on state
municipal-oversight boards, in Part IV.
119 Congress recently did just this. Roughly 20 percent of the 2009 stimulus package
consisted of funding for states and state programs. See Katherine Bradbury, State Government
Budgets and the Recovery Act *12 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public Policy Brief, Feb
2010), online at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppb/2010/ppbl01.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2011).
See generally American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub L No 111-5, 123 Stat
115.
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liquidity-a temporary crisis in funding-rather than insolvency."0 In
2008, the banks' plight could plausibly be viewed as a liquidity crisis:
their reliance on short-term funding created the risk of a run, and
their interconnectedness stoked worries of a system-wide crisis if any
one failed."' Although liquidity issues do figure in the states' recent
travails-state revenues have dipped due to the recession and will
likely rebound as economic conditions improve-the woes of the
most troubled states are far more than simply liquidity issues.'
States also do not depend on the kind of short-term funding that
makes bank financing so fragile," and they are not interconnected in
the same way as the largest financial institutions were, as discussed
more fully below. In each of these respects, the case for intervention
is much weaker.
Some might argue that federal and state finances are so
intertwined already that an additional, one-shot federal rescue
package could not be criticized. It is just more money, on this view,
in a framework that already involves substantial federal financing of
state activities.' But federal funding initiatives are not
interchangeable. Each must be assessed on its own merits. There
may be-and in my view, are-good reasons for concern about the
structure of Medicaid funding, for instance, but quite different
concerns about federal rescue financing. A direct bailout would,
among other things, externalize the costs of a state's profligacy to
other states.'"
120 This insight dates back at least to the nineteenth-century British economist Walter
Bagehot. See Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market 173 (C.
Kegan Paul 7th ed 1878).
121 For an argument that the TARP legislation was justified based on liquidity concerns
but that the ad hoc bailouts of Bear Stearns and other major financial institutions were not, see
David A. Skeel Jr, The New Financial Deal. Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its
(Unintended) Consequences 132-35 (Wiley 2011).
122 See, for example, Dougherty, Higher Taxes, Wall St J at A4 (cited in note 47) (noting
that tax collections have increased since their recession lows, but that serious fiscal problems
remain).
123 The closest analogue to financial institutions' dependence on repurchase-agreement-
based ("repo-based") financing is states' use of short-term revenue- or tax-anticipation notes
(RANS or TANS) to plug holes in their financing. But repos are often one-day obligations,
whereas RANs and TANs are longer and make up a much smaller portion of a state's funding.
124 Richard Schragger criticizes this Article's state bankruptcy proposal on this basis.
Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 Yale L J 860, 877 (2012), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1943529 (visited Nov 26, 2011) (intergovernmental "transfers are so
significant as to make the worry about a one-time bailout seem odd").
125 My focus here is on simple rescue funding. If limited financial support is coupled with
a requirement that the state restructure its obligations in important respects, the effect is in
many respects similar to bankruptcy. This alternative, which New York State used with New
York City in 1975, is discussed in Part IV.
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Even if normative objections did not preclude a bailout, the
practical obstacles might. Given the lingering hostility to the 2008
bailouts, a large federal intervention on behalf of a troubled state
may not be politically plausible.'26 It is also far from clear that the
federal government could afford to intervene at the level necessary
to rescue a financially troubled state. This dilemma is not unique to
the current historical moment. State crises invariably come at times
when the federal government also is financially strapped.'27
The other major option, a state default, would be the financial
equivalent of a tsunami. First, default would impose large, sudden
losses on the creditors affected. This likely would include
bondholders, since other obligations will seem more urgent.'"
Second, the state would have almost complete control over which
creditors to pay and which to stop paying, which would create deep
uncertainty. This uncertainty would roil the credit markets long
before the state actually defaulted. Finally, default would not relieve
the state of its obligations. If the state defaulted on its bonds, for
instance, it would still be obligated to pay them, which would bring
ongoing hassles such as the need to defend against bondholders'
efforts to collect." The ugly repercussions of default would linger.
A federal restructuring framework would be far more effective
than either of the existing options in the event of a catastrophe. It is
likely to be much less costly than a bailout and would avoid the
distortions that bailouts create in the credit markets. Moreover, the
bailout option may not even be available. In contrast to default,
bankruptcy would provide an orderly response to a state's financial
distress, and the restructuring would permanently discharge the
state's obligations.
126 Although the origins of the Tea Party movement are complex, anger at the bailouts
clearly was one of the contributing factors. See Ross Douthat, The Great Bailout Backlash, NY
Times A27 (Oct 25, 2011).
127 See, for example, See Davey, The State That Went Bust, NY Times at WK3 (cited in
note 6).
128 Historically, bondholders have been the principal victim of state defaults. See Orth,
The Judicial Power of the United States at 44-46 (cited in note 1) (describing bondholder
efforts to circumvent sovereign immunity obstacles to recovery). Although bondholders are
less likely to be out-of-state residents than in the nineteenth century, states still would be likely
to default on bonds before shutting down core governmental functions.
129 This has been an ongoing headache for Argentina since it restructured its bonds
through ad hoc exchange offers in 2003. Bondholders that did not accept the restructuring have
continued to pursue their claims by seeking to attach Argentine assets around the world. See
Settling Up, Economist 48 (Oct 31, 2009).
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III. WHY RESIST A STATE-BANKRUPTCY FRAMEWORK?
Why, given these benefits, has state bankruptcy met such stout
resistance? The answer may lie in part in the idiosyncrasies of recent
politics. Almost as soon as state bankruptcy was proposed, it was
pulled into the vortex of a partisan battle over public employee
unions."n A second factor is simply that many of the benefits that we
have just considered have not been well understood. The perception
that bankruptcy would be devastating to public employees, for
instance, who are a key source of the political impasse,
underappreciates bankruptcy's tendency to distribute sacrifice more
broadly than ad hoc restructuring does.
But the resistance to state bankruptcy rests on more than
misperceptions and unfortunate political framing alone. Even if
these obstacles were removed, additional doubts would remain. In
this Part, I take up six of the most important of the objections and
argue that they complicate but do not undermine the case for a
bankruptcy framework for states.
A. State Bankruptcy Would Not Be Constitutional
Some critics question the constitutionality of a state-bankruptcy
regime.'3' Even if it were a brilliant solution to states' financial
distress, the reasoning goes, state bankruptcy would impermissibly
interfere with the state's sovereignty. State bankruptcy might also
encounter turbulence under the Contracts Clause, because it would
alter existing contracts, which the states themselves ordinarily cannot
do.
32
These issues were hashed out for municipalities in a pair of cases
that straddled the Supreme Court's famous "switch in time" in the
1930s. In Ashton v Cameron County Water Improvement District
130 State bankruptcy was framed in some circles primarily as a tool for punishing public
employee unions. As Doug Elliot has noted, this generated some Republican support but
assured that "Democrats in Congress [would oppose bankruptcy] virtually unanimously."
Elliot, Potential Federal Roles at 12 (cited in note 84). Further opposition was prompted by
bond market representatives, who persuaded a number of Republican lawmakers to withhold
support. See, for example, Michael A. Fletcher, No Bankruptcy Option for States, Cantor Says,
Wash Post A14 (Jan 25, 2011).
131 For a nuanced analysis of the issue, viewed through the lens of the Supreme Court's
two 1930s municipal bankruptcy cases, see Anna Lund, State Bankruptcy: Lessons from
Ashton and Bekins *29.50 (unpublished manuscript, 2011) (on file with author).
132 The Contracts Clause states that no state may "pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts." US Const Art 1, § 10, cl 1 (listing various restrictions on the powers
of the states). It generally forbids the alternation of existing contracts, although it is subject to
exceptions under extraordinary circumstances. See Part III.C (discussing Contracts Clause
limits on state restructuring statutes).
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No 1,3 the Court struck down the original 1934 municipal
bankruptcy law under both the Tenth Amendment and the Contracts
Clause."M "If obligations of states or their political subdivisions may
be subjected to the interference here attempted," the majority held,
"they are no longer free to manage their own affairs .... And really
the sovereignty of the state, so often declared necessary to the
federal system, does not exist.' 3. Although the Contracts Clause
limits the states, not Congress, the majority also held that the
bankruptcy statute impermissibly enabled a state to impair contracts
"by granting any permission necessary to enable Congress so to
do. 36
Two years later, the Supreme Court upheld a new municipal
bankruptcy framework that differed only in minor details from its ill-
fated predecessor. "7 In United States v Bekins," the Court quoted
with approval the assurance of the language of a congressional
report that the framework "avoids any restriction on the powers of
the States or their arms of government," and that "[n]o involuntary
proceedings are allowable.'. 9 "The statute is carefully drawn so as
not to impinge upon the sovereignty of the State," the Court
concluded, and it is authorized by Congress's powers under the
bankruptcy clause.'40
For over seventy years, the constitutionality of a municipal
bankruptcy law with the features just described has been well settled.
This strongly suggests that a state-bankruptcy law that could be
invoked only by the state itself, and which avoided interference with
state decision making, also would adequately safeguard state
sovereignty. Such a law would only be struck down on sovereignty
grounds under one of two circumstances: the sovereignty concerns of
state bankruptcy are different and greater than with municipal
bankruptcy, or Bekins itself is no longer good law.
The first possibility is implausible. Cities and states are different,
of course, but the Court's analysis of municipal restructuring is
133 298 US 513 (1936).
134 Id at 531-32.
135 Id at 531.
136 Id.
137 United States v Bekins, 304 US 27 (1938).
138 304 US 27 (1938).
139 Id at 51 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
140 Id. Although a substantial number of states have enacted legislation authorizing their
municipalities to file for Chapter 9, roughly half have not. See Alexander M. Laughlin,
Municipal Insolvencies: A Primer on the Treatment of Municipalities under Chapter 9 of the US
Bankruptcy Code 17-22 (Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP Mar 2005), online at
http://www.abiworld.org/pdfs/ municipal-primer.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2011).
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premised on municipalities' status as creatures of the state.'' Federal
interference with a city is interference with a state. State bankruptcy
would act more directly on the state, of course, but analogous
protections seem likely to satisfy sovereignty concerns.
The second potential distinction is not so easily dismissed. State
sovereignty has been a preeminent concern for a majority of the
justices of the current Supreme Court. In its anticommandeering
cases, for instance, the Court has struck down federal legislation that
requires the states to address issues that are of concern to
Congress.' 2 Although the requirement that a state consent to
bankruptcy vitiates this objection, the Court has suggested that the
state itself is not the only consideration. Sovereign immunity also is
designed to protect the federal structure. 3 Under an expansive
reading of the Tenth Amendment, the Court might return to pre-
Bekins conceptions of state sovereignty and strike down not just
state bankruptcy but municipal bankruptcy as well on the grounds
that the legislation insinuates federal decision makers too deeply into
state affairs.
Although this cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely. The federal
government has already inserted itself into state affairs quite
intrusively in other areas, imposing Medicaid funding obligations,
welfare restrictions, and a wide variety of other constraints.'" The
government's interest is at least as great in the bankruptcy context,
given the large subsidy the federal government provides for state
debt by exempting it from tax and the pressure for federal assistance
if a state falls into distress.'" Unless the Court is prepared to strike
down many of the other programs, a state-bankruptcy law also seems
safe. State bankruptcy also would benefit from the wide scope the
141 "The State acts in aid, and not in derogation, of its sovereign powers" when it permits
it municipalities to file for bankruptcy, the Court wrote in Bekins. 304 US at 54. "It invites the
intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its agency which the State itself is powerless to
rescue." Id.
142 See, for example, New York v United States, 505 US 144, 188 (1992).
143 In Bond v United States, 131 S Ct 2355, 2364 (2011), the Court emphasized that
"[s]tates are not the sole intended beneficiaries of federalism." The (uncertain) implications of
the structural dimension of sovereign immunity are discussed in Michael W. McConnell,
Extending Bankruptcy Law to States: Is it Constitutional?, in Conti-Brown and Skeel, When
States Go Broke at *234-35 (cited in note 24).
144 These federal-state partnerships are discussed in somewhat more detail in Part IV.B.
See note 233 and accompanying text.
145 According to one estimate, the value of the tax exempt status of state and municipal
bond interest will be roughly $161.6 billion between 2010 and 2014. Joint Committee on
Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2010-2014, JCS-3-10, llth
Cong, 2d Sess 51 (Dec 15, 2010), online at
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3718 (visited Nov 25, 2011).
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Court has given to Congress's exercise of authority under the
Bankruptcy Clause. In a different bankruptcy context, the Court
recently held that the Bankruptcy Clause trumps state sovereignty
concerns.'" Together, these factors bode well for a well-crafted state-
bankruptcy law even in an era of heightened concern for state
sovereignty.
In the prior cases, the state sovereignty and Contracts Clause
analyses have tended to travel in tandem, which suggests that a state-
bankruptcy law that successfully ran the state sovereignty gauntlet
would likely survive Contracts Clause scrutiny."' The two inquiries
are not identical, however. The Contracts Clause cases have
emphasized that states can impair existing contracts only under dire
circumstances and suggest that courts will consider whether
creditors' rights are adequately protected. Under current Chapter 9,
the "best interests of the creditors" test serves this function by
requiring that creditors be treated better than they would under any
realistic alternative.'" If a state-bankruptcy law lacked a protection of
this kind, it might be struck down as facilitating a state's violation of
the Contracts Clause.' So long as the bankruptcy law includes this
protection, it should satisfy the Contracts Clause. If a state-
bankruptcy law successfully ran the state sovereignty gauntlet, it
therefore should also survive Contracts Clause scrutiny.
The constitutional objections to state bankruptcy are far from
silly. But it is hard to imagine the Court striking down state-
146 Central Virginia Community College v Katz, 546 US 356, 378 (2006).
147 The trend line in cases in which states authorize contractual restructuring has been
toward a somewhat more flexible Contracts Clause. See, for example, United Automobile v
Fortuna, 633 F3d 37, 39 (1st Cir 2011) (affirming the dismissal of a Contracts Clause objection
to Puerto Rican legislation suspending public employee collective bargaining agreements).
Even if the Supreme Court curtails these developments in the lower courts, it seems much less
likely to invalidate a federal restructuring statute as violating the Contracts Clause, given
Congress's broad authority under the Bankruptcy Clause.
148 The best interests of the creditor requirement is housed, but not explained, in 11 USC
§ 943(b)(7). In the words of one commentary, courts should "apply the test to require a
reasonable effort by the municipal debtor that is a better alternative to its creditors than
dismissal of the case." 6 Collier on Bankruptcy § 943.03(7)(a) at 943-32 (cited in note 70).
149 For the related argument that the Contracts Clause requires that municipal
bankruptcy include "best interests of the creditors" protection, see McConnell and Picker, 60
U Chi L Rev at 480 (cited in note 58)
Faitoute stands for the proposition that the Contracts Clause is not violated if-as a
practical and not a technical matter-the state substitutes a remedy that is as valuable as
the one that had been contracted for. In effect, the Contracts Clause allows state
municipal bankruptcy laws but constitutionalizes a 'best interest of the creditors' test,
preventing the states from adopting debt adjustment programs that benefit the municipal
debtor at the expense of the creditors.
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bankruptcy legislation that assures that the principal decision-
making authority remains securely in state hands.
B. The States' Existing Tools Are Enough
According to a second objection, some states may be in a deep
fiscal hole, but they will somehow muddle through their difficulties.
Some argue that the state fiscal crisis is simply the inevitable
consequence of a financial downturn, and that it will ease when
economic conditions improve."' Others view the current predicament
as more dire but contend that the states have adequate mechanisms
for responding. Focusing principally on the costs of public employee
unions, municipal finance scholar E.J. McMahon insists that "state
officials committed to cutting costs already have options for putting
the squeeze on their unions. ' '5' In addition to layoffs or involuntary
furloughs, McMahon argues, states can restrict public employees'
collective bargaining rights, a step several states have taken since
McMahon wrote."' McMahon also suggests that states are better off
restructuring their pension problems outside bankruptcy than under
the auspices of a federal bankruptcy law.' 3
Each of these is indeed an important option for dealing with
unsustainable obligations. But they also have substantial limitations.
With the exception of layoffs and furloughs, a state's tools for
addressing unsustainable contracts with its public employee unions
ordinarily apply only to future contracts. Cutting back on collective
bargaining rights may give the state leverage with future collective
bargaining agreements, for instance, but the Contracts Clause limits
a state's capacity to rework existing contracts."
With pensions, the state's restructuring options differ in
different states. In some of the most troubled states, state lawmakers
have very little flexibility. Illinois and New York, for instance,
prohibit state lawmakers from altering the pensions of current
150 This claim is often coupled with a contention that the states' fiscal troubles are not as
severe as naysayers claim. See, for example, Lav and McNichol, Misunderstandings Regarding
State Debt at 1 (cited in note 14) (criticizing the "mistaken impression that drastic and
immediate measures are needed to avoid an imminent fiscal meltdown").
151 E.J. McMahon, State Bankruptcy Isa Bad Idea, Wall St J A17 (Jan 24,2011).
152 See, for example, Kris Maher and Ilan Brat, Wisconsin Curbs Unions-GOP
Governor to Quickly Sign Limits on Bargaining Rights as Democrats Fume, Wall St J A3 (Mar
11,2011).
153 Id.
154 Limits but does not remove altogether. Under the exception for emergency conditions,
states have some authority to alter existing contracts in the event of a crisis. The classic case is
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co v City of Asbury Park, 316 US 502 (1942). But Faitoute may be shaky
in the current Court and is likely to be construed narrowly, as discussed further in Part III.C.
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employees.5' The restriction applies not only to pension rights that
an employee has already earned but also to those she has not yet
earned. Other states are not so restrictive, but even the smallest
adjustments are fiercely and often successfully contested."
The story is similar with bond debt. It is possible for the state to
restructure unsustainable bond debt, but very difficult. Most bonds
issued by states do not have so-called collective action clauses, under
which a majority of bondholders can vote to restructure the bonds.' 7
This means that no bondholder can be forced to accept a reduction
in his promised payout unless he affirmatively agrees to it. The state
could try to achieve a restructuring by making an offer to its
bondholders and conditioning the offer on acceptance by a very high
percentage of the bonds, a strategy that has been employed in other
contexts." This strategy could achieve a restructuring, but the need
to persuade a large percentage of the bonds to agree may limit its
extent, and the state would remain liable in full to any bondholders
who did not sign on."
The analysis thus far suggests that bankruptcy would
appreciably expand the toolkit states have for addressing their
financial predicaments. This by itself is not grounds enough for
dismissing the "states can do it on their own" objection, however. If
states have a bankruptcy option, some worry, state legislators won't
work quite so hard to make the hard choices that are necessary to
relieve a state's financial distress."'
155 See note 82.
156 For an excellent overview of the extent to which pensions can be adjusted, see
generally Monahan, 5 Educ Fin & Policy 617 (cited in note 87). See also id at 638-39
(providing a chart summarizing pensions protected on a state-by-state basis).
157 Schwarcz, 59 UCLA L Rev at 329-31 (cited in note 40) ("Relatively few state bond
issues currently include collective action clauses or their equivalent."). A collective action
clause is a provision that makes a vote to restructure binding on every bondholder if the
specified majority of bonds approves the restructuring. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Pub L
No 111-229, 53 Stat 1149, codified at 15 USC § 77aaa et seq, forbids collective action provisions
in corporate debt, but it does not apply to state or sovereign debt. See The Trust Indenture Act
of 1939 § 316, codified at 15 USC § 77ppp(b); The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 304, codified
at 15 USC § 77ddd(a)(4)(A), (a)(6).
158 See, for example, John C. Coffee Jr and William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The
Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U Chi L
Rev 1207, 1214-15 (1991) (describing strategies used to pressure bondholders to participate);
Lee C. Buchheit and G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L
Rev 59, 65-66 (2000) (proposing this strategy for sovereign debt).
159 In the corporate bond context, exchange offers are often conditioned on 90 or 95
percent participation. Coffee and Klein, 58 U Chi L Rev at 1215 n 26 (cited in note 158).
160 See, for example, McMahon, State Bankruptcy Wall St J at A17 (cited in note 151);
Adam Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 Cornell L Rev *5, 38-43
(forthcoming 2012), online at http://ssm.com/abstract=1898775 (visited Nov 25, 2011).
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This is a legitimate concern. It is a version of the well-known
concern that providing a soft landing in bankruptcy will distort
prebankruptcy decision-making incentives.' But it is premised on
the assumption that state decision makers will be tempted by the
bankruptcy option. They are far more likely to view it as a last resort.
Few state governors will relish being remembered as the governor
who put his or her state into bankruptcy. It is more plausible that a
state would use the threat of filing for bankruptcy to try to persuade
the federal government to provide rescue financing on generous
terms, as municipalities have sometimes done with states. 2 But the
threat would be effective only if it were credible (that is, federal
officials believed that the state really might file for bankruptcy), if
federal officials believed that a bankruptcy filing would have
dangerous spillover effects throughout the economy, and if the
federal government were politically and financially capable of
funding a bailout. Moreover, states can make a similar threat-the
threat to default on their debt-even in the absence of a state-
bankruptcy option. State bankruptcy is more likely to defuse the
pressure for a federal bailout than to increase it, as we have seen."
C. State Restructuring Alternatives
Even if a state's existing tools were insufficient, a state might
attempt to craft its own restructuring framework. Indeed, they have
sometimes done so in the past. At the end of the Great Depression,
New Jersey enacted legislation that authorized the restructuring of
municipal bonds if two-thirds of the bondholders approved.
Although the statute was challenged under the Contracts Clause-
the plaintiffs argued that it interfered with the terms of their
contract-the Supreme Court upheld it in a 1942 case.' Under this
approach, a state might tailor its restructuring regime to its own
161 See, for example, Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 Cornell L Rev
439, 473-76 (1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 Intl Rev L &
Econ 223,230 (1991).
162 See Gillette, 79 U Chi L Rev at 325-27 (cited in note 62). Gillette cites Camden, New
Jersey's 1999 Chapter 9 filing, Harrisburg's recent negotiations with Pennsylvania, and the
New York City rescue in 1975 as examples of the use of bankruptcy or the threat of
bankruptcy to limit the scope of state intervention. Id at 324-26.
163 See Part II.F. The strategic interaction between federal officials and the state is
discussed in more detail in Part IV.C.
164 Faitoute, 316 US at 508-09.
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circumstances, with some adopting a limited framework or none at
all, and others devising a more comprehensive approach.'65
I confess that I find this objection alluring, not least because I
have made somewhat similar proposals in my own work in the past."
It is subject to very serious limitations in this context, however. The
first difficulty is simply that a state would have limited room to
maneuver to the extent it wished to rework existing obligations,
rather than solely not-yet-incurred ones. To be sure, states are not
barred from making any adjustments to existing contracts. Under
current law, a subsequent modification of a state's financial
obligations may be constitutional if it is "reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose," so long as no less drastic option
is available and the state's objective could not be achieved without
impairing contractual obligations.67 In Faitoute Iron & Steel Co v City
of Asbury Park,'" the Supreme Court upheld a state statute that
provided for a binding vote on the restructuring of a municipality's
bonds. But the important public purpose exception has never been
broadly construed, and subsequent Supreme Court cases hint at
possible retrenchment;'6" the exception may be too slim a reed on
which to hang a comprehensive restructuring framework.'7" Even if
Faitoute remains good law, which is uncertain, states may not be able
to enact a more complete restructuring framework. This may mean
that only a purely prospective state-enacted law would survive
constitutional scrutiny.
The second and perhaps more important limitation is political.
In the current environment, state lawmakers who believe that their
state would be bailed out in a crisis have little incentive to enact
restructuring legislation that might make a bailout less likely and as a
165 George Triantis makes this argument in a new article, see generally George T.
Triantis, Let the States Design Their Own Restructuring Process, in Conti-Brown and Skeel,
eds, When States Go Broke (cited in note 24), as does Richard Hynes, State Default and
Synthetic Bankruptcy (unpublished manuscript 2011) (on file with author).
166 See David A. Skeel Jr, Rethinking the Line between Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 Tex L Rev 471, 513-25 (1994) (arguing that the states should regulate
corporate bankruptcy, just as they regulate corporate law).
167 US Trust Co v New Jersey, 431 US 1, 25, 30 (1977).
168 316 US 502 (1942).
169 In Faitoute itself, the Supreme Court emphasized that a heavy majority of the
bondholders favored restructuring, and that the restructuring was necessary to protect the
value of the bonds. Id at 506. In US Trust, the Court struck down the state statute. 431 US
at 32.
170 At the least, the framework would need to include creditor protections comparable to
bankruptcy's "best interests of the creditors" requirement, as discussed earlier. See notes 148-
49 and accompanying text.
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result increase their borrowing costs today."' The states that
currently are most troubled -California, Illinois, New York, New
Jersey-are precisely the states that the government is most likely to
bail out if their debt becomes unsustainable.
Notice that neither of these points suggests that state legislation
is a bad idea-particularly to the extent it has prospective scope and
thus addresses the Contracts Clause difficulty. But the possibility of a
state framework does not justify forgoing federal legislation for
states.
D. The Absence of Political Will
According to a fourth objection, the same political impediments
that could stymie a state's efforts to address its problems outside
bankruptcy would prove just as debilitating in bankruptcy. "[I1f
Gov[ernor] Jerry Brown and the California legislature are unwilling
to rewrite their collective bargaining rules," E.J. McMahon has
argued, "why assume they would plead with a federal judge to do it
for them?"" If a governor refuses to make hard choices, or the
legislature thwarts him or her, the reasoning goes, bankruptcy will
not prove any more effective, because the same politicians will be
making the decisions in bankruptcy.
Politics do indeed make state bankruptcy more delicate than
ordinary corporate bankruptcy. But the political will argument is
flawed in two respects. The first is that political will sometimes may
not be the problem. Even if a state has the political will to make
changes, lawmakers may not be able to solve the state's problems
fully with the tools available outside bankruptcy. "3 Bankruptcy would
thus be justified even if some states might lack the political will to
use all of the levers at their disposal outside bankruptcy.
Second, bankruptcy could alter the political dynamics in several
ways. Lawmakers who would resist cuts to a particular constituency
outside bankruptcy might be persuaded to approve bankruptcy if they
concluded that the sacrifice would be distributed more evenly, for
instance. The absence of political will outside bankruptcy thus will not
always translate to a similar absence in bankruptcy. In addition, the
bankruptcy law itself can be structured to reduce some of the political
171 This surely is at least one reason California Treasurer Bill Lockyer so quickly and
stridently condemned the concept bankruptcy for states. See Press Release, Treasurer Lockyer
Criticizes Effort to Let States File for Bankruptcy (Jan 21, 2011), online at
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/news/releases/2011/20110121.pdf (visited Nov 25,2011).
172 McMahon, State Bankruptcy, Wall St J at A17 (cited in note 151).
173 The additional tools available in bankruptcy are discussed in Part II.D.
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obstacles to an effective restructuring. I have assumed throughout this
discussion that any bankruptcy law would have some of the same basic
features as corporate and municipal bankruptcy have, such as a vote
by creditors on a restructuring plan that was proposed by the debtor's
existing decision makers.'7" But Congress could adjust the framework
in a wide variety of ways. Consider two possible alternatives.'7'
First, Congress could adopt a simple, severe bankruptcy
framework that automatically discharged all of a state's obligations
shortly after it filed for bankruptcy.'76 Under this approach, secured
creditors would be entitled to their collateral, but all of the state's
contracts would be terminated and its obligations to general
creditors would be canceled. Chapter 7 currently functions somewhat
similarly for consumer debtors: bankruptcy provides an immediate
discharge.'7 Under such a system, the only issue for a state would be
whether to file or not in the first instance. To be sure, the state would
likely wish to reaffirm at least some of its obligations.' " But the
discharge would ensure that debt overhang was dealt with even if
state decision makers subsequently reached an impasse."
Second, the bankruptcy process could simplify the decision-
making process even under a more traditional restructuring
framework. Rather than requiring the governor and both houses of
the legislature to propose a restructuring plan, Congress might vest
this authority directly in the governor, perhaps together with an
obligation for the governor to consult with the legislature. Such a
plan presumably could not commit the state to measures, such as a
tax increase, that require legislative approval outside bankruptcy."'
But it could restructure the state's obligations in other respects (and
could be made conditional on subsequent legislative approval where
necessary). Congress's authority under the Bankruptcy Clause to
174 See 11 USC § 1124(a)-(g).
175 I discuss the mechanics of a possible state bankruptcy law in more detail elsewhere.
See generally Skeel, State Bankruptcy from the Ground Up (cited in note 24).
176 The proposal described in this paragraph was suggested by Barry Adler at a recent
conference.
177 In theory, a consumer debtor who files for Chapter 7 must turn over all of her
nonexempt assets to the trustee in return for the bankruptcy discharge. But the vast majority of
consumer debtors have no nonexempt assets. See Michelle J. White, Abuse or Protection?
Economics of Bankruptcy Reform under BAPCPA, 2007 U Ill L Rev 275, 284.
178 Consumer reaffirmation requires court approval under 11 USC § 524(d)(2).
179 One can imagine objections to this framework, such as the concern that it might be
triggered on a whim. Rather than working out the necessary adjustments, my objective here is
simply to show that nonbankruptcy political limitations need not impede restructuring in
bankruptcy.
180 See, for example, Hynes, State Default at *51 n 201 (cited in note 165) (emphasizing
these concerns).
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provide for a bankruptcy discharge thus should enable it to simplify
the decision-making process.
In short, political factors would make state bankruptcy more
difficult than an ordinary bankruptcy. But they do not undermine the
argument for a bankruptcy option; they strengthen it.
E. Bond Contagion
The fifth objection focuses on bankruptcy's effect on the
municipal bond market. "Just the availability of a bankruptcy option
and the potential bond default could severely damage state credit
ratings and destroy the trust of bondholders," as New York's
comptroller put it. "Our economy cannot withstand another crisis in
confidence.' '.' "[I]f we in fact create.., a state bankruptcy chapter,"
another critic warned, "'I see all sorts of snakes coming out of that
pit,' as '[b]ankruptcy for states could-would cripple bond
markets." '' Fear of bond market contagion gives pause to many
who might otherwise find the arguments for a bankruptcy backstop
compelling."n
First, a note about confusion in bond terminology. Credit rating
agencies and other market participants often use the term
"municipal bond" broadly to include debt issued by states as well as
debt issued by true municipalities such as cities and counties. When
commentators point to recent volatility in the municipal bond
markets as evidence of the risk of contagion, the markets in question
include both states and municipalities. Yet municipalities have had a
bankruptcy option for decades. It is only states that do not.
Gyrations in the prices of both state and municipal debt thus suggest
that the volatility does not stem from the existence or absence of a
bankruptcy option. Indeed, a bankruptcy option could decrease
volatility rather than increase it, because it would provide an orderly
alternative to the possibility of a catastrophic default. This does not
require us to dismiss the bond market contagion argument, but it
does highlight the need to carefully distinguish the effects of a
181 Thomas P. DiNapoli, Even Talk of Bankruptcy Is a Bad Solution for States, Wall St J
A16 (Jan 24, 2011) (arguing that the creation of a state bankruptcy regime would negatively
affect even fiscally responsible states' access to capital markets).
182 Henes and Hessler, 245 NY L J at S6 (cited in note 31), quoting State Insolvency
Hearings (cited in note 18) (statement of Rep Coble).
183 Some critics who warn of bond market contagion have an obvious self interest in
fending off a bankruptcy option, such as officials in troubled states that might find their
leverage in negotiations for a federal bailout diminished if a bankruptcy law were passed. But
others are more disinterested, and I put motives to the side to focus on the objection's merits.
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bankruptcy option from other factors, such as the general risk of
default.
It is even more important to define just what contagion "is."
Contagion can take one or more of three forms. The first,
information contagion, is a negative shock that stems from
information that one entity's troubles convey about other similar
entities." During the 2008 financial crisis, Lehman's default created
information contagion because other major banks held the same
kinds of (mortgage-backed) assets as Lehman. The default signaled
that these assets were even more problematic than had been thought.
The second, related form of contagion is a confidence crisis." If one
entity's collapse creates uncertainty as to the financial health of its
peers, the collapse may trigger a sudden, market-wide flight by
creditors of the peer entities, even if they do not have the same
assets or financial structure. The final form of contagion is
counterparty contagion. If counterparties -that is, the entity's
creditors-hold large amounts of the entity's debt, a failure by the
entity to pay may create a financial crisis for the counterparty itself."*
Concerns that enactment of state bankruptcy would "cripple the
bond markets" have the second form of contagion principally in
mind. Unless the enactment were tied directly to one state's
impending default, it would not reveal new information about state
finances. The potential effect on the holders of state bonds also
appears to be secondary."n The real concern is that congressional
action would trigger a confidence crisis.
If I am correct about this, the bond market contagion argument
rests on two key assumptions. The first is that the bond markets will
not differentiate (or will distinguish poorly) between states that are
financially sound and those at risk of default. The prospect that
financially troubled states might find it more costly to issue bonds
would not be troubling; in a properly functioning market, riskier
states should find it costlier to issue debt."
184 See Jean Helwege, Financial Firm Bankruptcy and Systemic Risk, 32 Reg 24, 24
(Summer 2009).
185 See Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel Jr, Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J Corp L 469,
472 (2010) (discussing crisis of confidence effects in 2008).
186 See Helwege, 32 Reg at 24 (cited in note 184).
187 But not irrelevant. The potential adverse effects on bondholders-and the nature of
bondholders-are discussed in the next Section. See Part III.F.
188 This is precisely what we see. The spreads (and thus the cost) of California and Illinois
debt have risen considerably during the recent crisis, reflecting their troubled financial
condition. See Katy Burne, Some Banks See Profit in Muni Woes, Wall St J C1 (Dec 21, 2010)
(reporting increased market for credit default swaps that compensate buyers if municipalities
miss bond payments). See also James M. Poterba and Kim S. Rueben, Fiscal News, State
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FIGURE 1. COST OF MUNI CREDIT-DEFAULT SWAPS
Source: Katy Burne,
(Dec 21, 2010).
me Banks See Profit in
Contagion is a serious concern only if the markets also punish fiscally
sound states. The second assumption is that this punishment would
be enduring. Because states have substantial flexibility when to issue
bonds, a temporary jump in interest rates when bankruptcy
legislation is enacted should not be alarming. The contagion concern
thus distills to a claim that enacting a bankruptcy law would impose
lasting costs on all states, not just those that are financially troubled.
Because states have never been permitted to file for bankruptcy,
we cannot test the contagion hypothesis directly. But we do have a
variety of empirical evidence from related contexts. One study, often
cited as evidence of contagion, explored the effects of Orange
County's municipal bankruptcy filing in 1994.189 Focusing on bond
prices a day after the Orange County filing, the study found a
market-wide decrease in municipal prices. Several aspects of the
study cast doubt on the claim that it shows that bankruptcy has
system-wide effects. First, because municipalities have had a
Budget Rules, and Tax-Exempt Bond Yields, 50 J Urb Econ 537, 559-60 (2001) (finding that
bond yields increase in response to news that a state's deficit is higher than expected).
189 John M. Halstead, Shantaram Hegde, and Linda Schmid Klein, Orange County
Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets, 39 Fin
Rev 293, 313 (2004).
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bankruptcy option since the 1930s, bond prices may have reacted to
the fact of Orange County's default, not to the bankruptcy
framework as distinct from default. Only if Orange County would
have avoided default but for the availability of bankruptcy -which
seems very unlikely-can bankruptcy be said to have triggered the
price decline. Second, the effect was very short term-one day is far
too short to suggest lasting effects. Finally, another study of the
Orange County filing found strong evidence that bond funds with a
disproportionate exposure to Orange County debt declined more
than other bond funds, which suggests that the markets do indeed
distinguish between the debt of healthy and troubled
municipalities."
A final set of studies explore changes in the sovereign-debt
markets. Perhaps the most directly relevant examined the reaction of
the sovereign-debt markets to the issuance by Mexico, after arm-
twisting by the US, and then other countries of New York
denominated bonds that included so-called collective action clauses
(CACs) in 2003.9' The CACs resemble a limited form of bankruptcy
because they enable a sovereign debtor to restructure its bond debt
by majority vote of its bondholders. A study of sovereign bond
offerings over the period from 1986 to 2007 found that the shift to
CACs did not have a significant price effect on sovereign debt."' We
should not read a great deal into this finding, given that sovereign
190 See Dwight V. Denison, Did Bond Fund Investors Anticipate the Financial Crisis of
Orange County?, 21 Mun Fin J 24, 32 (1999). For an argument that municipal bond markets
began distinguishing between weak and strong municipal bond issuers after the New York City
crisis, see David L. Hoffland, The "New York City Effect" in the Municipal Bond Market, 33
Fin Anal J 36, 36 (Mar-Apr 1977).
191 The introduction of collective action clauses in most new bond issuances came after a
debate over a variety of options for dealing with sovereign financial distress, including an IMF
proposal to implement a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. See Hal S. Scott, A
Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 Intl Law 103, 123-24 (2003). For a discussion
of the shift to CACs, see Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Pricing Terms in
Sovereign Debt Contracts: A Greek Case Study with Implications for the European Crisis
Resolution Mechanism *10-11 (University of Chicago John M. Olin Law and Economics
Working Paper No 541, Feb 1, 2011), online at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=1713914 (visited Nov 26, 2011); Michael Bradley, James D. Cox, and Mitu Gulati,
The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt
Market, 39 J Legal Stud 289, 295-97 (2010).
192 Bradley, Cox, and Gulati, 39 J Legal Stud at 301 (cited in note 191) (concluding that
the introduction of CACs "had little impact on the pricing of sovereign debt"). Bradley et al.
were testing the hypothesis that CACs actually would increase the price (and decrease the
cost) of sovereign debt by reducing the risk of bondholder holdouts to a restructuring. In a
more recent study, Michael Bradley and Mitu Gulati find that "CACs are associated with
lower spread for weaker nations" in the post 2002 period. Michael Bradley and Mitu Gulati,
Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis *50 (Working Paper, Oct
24, 2011), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948534 (visited Apr 13, 2012).
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countries are similar to but not the same as states," and CACs are a
more limited form of restructuring than bankruptcy. But the absence
of significant price effects suggests that increasing a country's
restructuring options need not cause market contagion. Another
sovereign debt study found a small premium for a Greek bond
without CACs as compared to Greek bonds with CACs, which may
imply that the market privileged a bond that was less likely to be
restructured, or might not be restructured as much, in a Greek
workout.' Other studies have examined the market's reaction to a
country's default, generally finding that the defaulting country loses
access to the bond markets temporarily, but that it can subsequently
return to the markets. '95 These studies do not speak directly to the
contagion issue, but they do provide further evidence as to the
resilience of bond markets.
Although the existing evidence cannot be said to definitively
refute the contagion objection, it suggests that contagion concerns
are overstated. There is little reason to believe that enactment of a
bankruptcy law for states would destabilize the bond markets, and
appreciable evidence indicating both that the market differentiates
between good and credit risks, and that any effect on bond prices
would be muted.
If this conclusion is correct, two important implications follow.
First, imperfections in the bond market are best addressed by bond
market reforms. The state and municipal debt markets provide
considerably less disclosure to investors than the markets for
corporate bonds.'" Not only are state and municipal budgets more
opaque than the balance sheets of most corporations (though large
financial institutions come close); investors also have less access to
current price data than with other bonds. Improving disclosure in the
193 States cannot devalue their currency in response to a crisis, for instance, as most
countries can. Interestingly, Greece and other Eurozone members have given up this sovereign
prerogative by adopting the euro as their common currency, which suggests that many of the
arguments for state bankruptcy would also apply to Europe.
194 Choi, Gulati, and Posner, Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts at *25 (cited in
note 191) (finding that the yield for English-law-governed Greek bonds, which included CACs,
was 212.7 basis points lower than the yield for Greek bonds without CACs at the outset of the
Greek crisis).
195 See, for example, R. Gaston Gelos, Ratna Sahay, and Guido Sandleris, Sovereign
Borrowing by Developing Countries: What Determines Market Access?, 83 J Intl Econ 243, 250
(2011) (finding, among other things, that a default, if resolved quickly, does not reduce
significantly the probability of tapping the markets).
196 See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial Federalism and the Short, Happy Life of
Municipal Securities Regulation, 34 J Corp L 739, 742-53 (2009); R. Penny Marquette and Earl
R. Wilson, The Case for Mandatory Municipal Disclosure: Do Seasoned Municipal Bond Yields
Impound Publicly Available Information?, 11 J Acct & Pub Pol 181, 184 (1992).
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bond markets would be a much more sensible response to these
issues than fending off state bankruptcy.'"
Second, contagion critics tend to assume that any reform that
might increase the cost of state bond debt is necessarily pernicious.
As we saw earlier, however, this assumption has things backwards.'"
States currently have too great an incentive to issue debt to fund
current spending, and the implicit bailout subsidy makes this debt
too cheap. If a bankruptcy framework diminished this subsidy and
debt costs rose modestly as a result, these consequences should be
praised, not condemned.
F. The Vulnerable Holders of State Debt?
The final objection focuses once again on the risk of contagion,
but the contagion concern is somewhat different. Rather than the
effect on states' ability to tap the bond market, this objection worries
about counterparty contagion-in this case, the plight of the holders
of state debt. According to state and municipal governance scholar
Nicole Gelinas, who has frequently raised this concern: "[I1f
Congress wants to raise the prospect [of state bankruptcy], it would
have to raise the prospect that a large bank or money-market fund,
too, could suffer large losses as a result of that default. After all,
banks own $229 billion in state and local debt, and money-market
funds own another $332 billion." State bankruptcy "could create
economic chaos," she argued, "forcing Congress, in the end, to save
the state or the bank."'"
It is impossible to consider this objection without casting a
glance across the Atlantic to recent developments in Greece and
elsewhere in Europe." The identity of the bondholders has figured
prominently in the debates over how to address Greece's debt crisis.
Much of the debt is held by French and German banks that might be
destabilized-or so European leaders feared-by a genuine
197 State disclosure concerning their public pensions is even more opaque than state bond
disclosure. Legislation introduced in late 2010 would require much more disclosure. See generally
Public Employee Pension Transparency Act, HR 6484, 111th Cong, 2d Sess (Dec 2, 2010).
198 See Part II.B.
199 Gelinas Statement at 3 (cited in note 96).
20 In a recent Stanford conference on state financial distress, Felix Salmon explicitly
linked the two situations, concluding that the ownership profile made state bankruptcy
impossible. Felix Salmon, When States Go Broke: The Economics and Finance of State Default
(The Arthur and Toni Rembe Rock Center for Corporate Governance and the Stanford
Constitutional Law Center May 13, 2011), online at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePxUCoR3bkQ#t=29m03s (visited Nov 25, 2011).
[79:677
States of Bankruptcy
restructuring."' Because banks hold a significant percentage of state
bonds, the European experience seems to suggest that state
bankruptcy raises the same concerns.
As the figures for a small sample of California, Illinois, and New
Jersey bonds in Table 1 illustrate, banks, mutual funds, and other
financial institutions are indeed large holders of state debt.
Vanguard, for instance, is the largest holder of the California bonds,
and the Illinois bonds are held by a bank and insurance companies.
Yet the bondholders' profile and its implications are quite different
with states than with Greece.
201 See, for example, Megan Murphy, et al, Greek Contagion Fears Spread to Other EU
Banks, Fin Times (June 15, 2011), online at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ac918946-975a-lleO-
9c9d-00l44feab49a,s01=l.html (visited Nov 25, 2011) (reporting French bank exposure at $53
billion, and German bank exposure at $34 billion). The European Central Bank boxed itself
into a corner by announcing that it would not be able to accept Greek bonds as collateral from
banks if Greece defaulted. Id. The Greek debt is finally being restructured as this Article goes
to press. The restructuring has been accompanied by measures, such as funding on generous
terms from the European Central Bank, designed to protect the banks.
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TABLE 1. LARGEST HOLDERS OF SELECTED STATE BONDS
Market Value
Symbol Holder Name (in millions of
dollars)
California St
CUSIP: Vanguard Group Inc 34.39
13063ACP
California St
CUSIP: Franklin Resources Inc 25.55
13063AAY
Blackrock Advisors 8.4
American Century Co 6.48
California St Blackrock Fund Advisers 6.03CUSIP:
13063ACP Wells Capital 1.47
13063ACP Management 1.47
Illinois St Spirit of America
452151XL Management Corp 0.49
Phoenix Investment Corp 0.24Illinois St The Pennsylvania Trust
CUSIP: Co 0.29452151XW Co 02
Bank of New York Mellon 1.02
Nationwide Indemnity 2.03
Illinois St Grange Mutual Casualty
CUSIP: Grup 1.5
452151XY Group
Illinois St
CUSIP: AGRI General Insurance 1
4521514J
New Jersey St National Public Finance
CUSIP: 47646039RB Guarantee Corp
646039RB
New Jersey St
CUSIP: QCC Insurance Co 1.18
646039PS
New Jersey St Putnam Investment
CUSIP:1.646039QH Mutual Fund
646039QH
New Jersey St American Empire Surplus
CUSIP: 14646039QH Lines Insurance Co
646039QH
Source: Bloomberg Terminal (Nov 7, 2011).
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The first difference is that the banks that hold Greek and other
troubled Eurozone debt are systemically important, and their
absolute exposure is high- roughly 53 and 34 billion euros for
French and German banks in Greece alone, according to recent
estimates.' Systemically important American banks- the banks that
were deemed too big to fail during the recent crisis-do not have
nearly so concentrated an exposure to state debt.' Second, the
debates in Europe have taken place in a context where the financial
calamity has already materialized. Absent a massive bailout, Greece
would have defaulted long before its recent restructuring. By
contrast, if Congress put a state-bankruptcy framework in place, it is
unlikely that any state would immediately invoke it. The mere
addition of a bankruptcy option would have a much more limited
effect on prices than an actual default or bankruptcy filing. The
comparison between Greece and state bankruptcy is thus
misleading.'
In the US context, the more relevant concern may be the
potential effect on money market firms that hold state debt. It is
possible that the enactment of a state-bankruptcy option would
induce money market funds to stop purchasing state debt, but this
seems unlikely. After all, money market funds hold municipal debt,
despite the fact that municipal debtors already have a bankruptcy
option.
The real holders of state bonds, unlike with Greek debt, are
wealthy individuals who hold them, either directly or through mutual
or money market funds, because of their tax-favored status. 5 State
bonds are especially attractive to wealthy individuals who live in the
state of issuance, because the holder benefits from the exemption
202 Id.
203 For example, the total fair value of Citigroup's available-for-sale securities held in
state and municipal bonds last year was only $13 billion compared to almost $100 billion in
foreign government debt. Citigroup, Annual Report 206 (2010), online at
http://www.citigroup.com/eiti/fin/data/arl0c-en.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2011).
204 One important and counterintuitive implication of this analysis is that it suggests that
the case for a bankruptcy framework is weaker in Europe than with US states. Because of the
potential for counterparty contagion, a European bankruptcy framework could prove
problematic, at least to the extent European banks continue to hold large amounts of one
another's debt. See generally Patrick Bolton and Olivier Jeanne, Sovereign Default Risk and
Bank Fragility in Financially Integrated Economies (NBER Working Paper No 16899, Mar
2011), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16899 (visited Nov 25, 2011) (modeling effects of
a decrease in the value of government debt on lending by banks that hold the debt).
205 See Steven Maguire, State and Local Government Debt. An Analysis 4 (Congressional
Research Service Mar 31, 2011), online at http://www.nasbo.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket
=4sLYoOHTYI8%3D&tabid... 1 (visited Nov 25, 2011).
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from the state's income tax as well as the federal exemption.' These
holders would be unhappy if state bankruptcy were enacted, given
that state bankruptcy could reduce (although probably only slightly)
the value of their bonds. But the effect of state bankruptcy on
wealthy bondholders would not be likely to have destabilizing effects
on American markets.
I do not mean to exaggerate the ease of a state-bankruptcy case.
The bankruptcy of a state would be messy and complex. But none of
the objections I have considered, either alone or collectively,
counsels against its enactment. To the contrary, they suggest that a
restructuring option would bring welcome benefits.
IV. THE MUNICIPAL CONTROL MODEL: A FEDERAL
ALTERNATIVE?
The debate over state bankruptcy has been conducted thus far
in strictly binary terms: either a bankruptcy law is enacted or, as
critics would have it, Congress leaves states to their own
restructuring devices. But these are not the only choices. As we have
already seen, a state-bankruptcy framework could take a wide
variety of forms. And traditional bankruptcy is not the only strategy
Congress might use to facilitate the financial restructuring of a
troubled state.
In this part, I explore the possibility of alternative federal
mechanisms for assisting an overencumbered state. The template for
structured federal assistance already exists: a number of states have
established municipal-oversight boards that enable them to intervene
in the affairs of their troubled cities. My discussion in this part begins
by describing two versions of this approach, the ad hoc restructuring
of New York City's finances in 1975 and the statutory frameworks
subsequently enacted in many states. I then consider the
constitutional limitations on a federal version of this strategy, which
prove far less restrictive than might be imagined, before comparing
its strengths and weaknesses to bankruptcy.
A. The Municipal-Oversight Boards and New York City
Over the past several decades, more than a dozen states have
enacted municipal-oversight boards authorizing the state to step in if
206 See, for example, Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, in Conti-
Brown and Skeel, eds, When States Go Broke *123, *136 (cited in note 24).
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a city or other municipality is in crisis." Under these frameworks,
state officials have access to municipal books and records and have
authority over-and sometimes the power to dictate the terms of-a
municipality's plan to restructure its finances."
An inspiration for many of these statutory frameworks was the
state and federal intervention in New York City in 1975 and 1976,
when New York wobbled toward financial collapse. We begin with
New York, then turn to the most recent and dramatic of the
restructuring frameworks, Michigan's new Local Government and
School District Fiscal Accountability Act of 2011.'
1. The New York City crisis.
"Ford to City: Drop Dead. 2 . For Americans of a certain age,
this famous New York Daily News headline conjures up memories of
the looming collapse of New York in the 1970s. As the recession of
the mid-1970s worsened, it became increasingly clear that New
York's massive public payroll, expanded public services, and other
costs were unsustainable. The Ford administration initially resisted
entreaties for help-hence the Daily News headline-but the state
intervened in dramatic fashion, providing both funding and extensive
oversight of the city's budget."'
The state and local intervention proceeded in three steps. First,
a group of financial leaders formed the Financial Community Liaison
Group (FCLG) with the encouragement of Mayor Abe Beame in
late 1974."' Intended to consolidate the advice of the financial
207 As of 1994, states that had adopted general legislation for distressed municipalities
included Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See Anthony G.
Cahill, et al, State Government Responses to Municipal Financial Distress: A Brave New World
for State-Local Intergovernmental Relations, 17 Pub Prod & Mgmt Rev 253, 255 (1994). New
York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Arizona had enacted ad hoc provisions aimed at the
financial travails of particular municipalities. Id.
208 Precisely because of these powers, Omer Kimhi has defended municipal-control
boards as superior to Chapter 9 bankruptcy. Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to
Municipal Financial Crises, 88 BU L Rev 633, 652-54 (2008).
209 2011 PA 4, codified at Mich Comp Laws §§ 141.1501 to 141.1531 (2011).
210 For discussion of the story, which appeared in the New York Daily News, see, for
example, Seymour P. Lachman and Robert Polner, The Man Who Saved New York: Hugh
Carey and the Great Fiscal Crisis of 1975 156-57 (SUNY 2010). Ford never actually said "drop
dead." Governor Hugh Carey's biographer reports that Ford approached a Carey aide in 2001
to emphasize this fact. Id at 157.
211 Among the best accounts of the drama are Robert W. Bailey, The Crisis Regime: The
MAC, the EFCB, and the Political Impact of the New York City Financial Crisis 1-12 (SUNY
1984); Martin Shefter, Political Crisis/Fiscal Crisis: the Collapse and Revival of New York City
xxvii-xxx (Basic 1985); Lachman and Polner, Hugh Carey at 75-166 (cited in note 210).
212 Bailey, Crisis Regime at 19-20 (cited in note 211).
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community, the FCLG had no formal authority and a perceived lack
of democratic accountability, and proved ineffectual as a result."3 In
early 1975, the state legislature established the Municipal Assistance
Corporation (MAC), whose members included Lazard Freres
partner Felix Rohatyn and Columbia Teachers College professor
Donna Shalala, who would later serve as secretary of education in
the Clinton Administration."' The MAC was given control over New
York's sales tax and securities fees, as backing for its issuance of new
bonds. This gave the MAC significant funding authority-and thus
valuable carrots to entice reform-but relatively little direct
oversight power."' That came with the third intervention, the state's
enactment of the Financial Emergency Act,"'° which created the
Emergency Financial Control Board (EFCB)."7 In addition to
launching the EFCB, the legislation provided for $750 million in
state rescue funding as part of a $2.3 billion rescue package, codified
a recent New York City wage freeze, and established a special
deputy comptroller for the city, to report to State Comptroller
Arthur Levitt. Under the terms of its enactment, the EFCB was
authorized to devise and approve a three-year budget to return the
city to solvency, to exercise veto power over city borrowing,
supervise the use of all city revenues, file for bankruptcy and
propose a reorganization plan, and implement the wage freeze. 8
Throughout 1975, the Ford administration resisted the
entreaties of New York Governor Hugh Carey, a former six-term
congressman, for federal help. The Ford speech that prompted the
"Drop Dead" headline (what Ford actually said was "I am prepared
to veto any bill that has as its purpose a bailout of New York City to
prevent a default"), which Carey first saw during a late dinner with
Rohatyn at Elaine's, actually triggered a shift in public sympathy to
New York."9 According to Carey's biographer, New York's
213 Id at 23 (noting that the FCLG's "absence of legal formality was matched by a
narrowness of political base").
214 For a lengthy description of the MAC and its powers, see id at 23-36.
215 Bailey characterizes the MAC as "deal[ing] increasingly in symbolic politics" and
"breaking apart a stable, if inadequate policy-making process." Id at 35.
216 New York State Financial Emergency Act for The City of New York, 1975 NY Sess
Laws 1408-44.
217 For an overview of the EFCB and its powers, see Bailey, Crisis Regime at 36-43 (cited
in note 211) (noting that the EFCB was invested with even broader powers than the MAC).
218 Id at 41-43. New York City's public employees came under enormous pressure to
acquire city bonds for the unions' pension funds as part of the overall plan, and they eventually
agreed to do so. See Daniel Fischel and John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U Chi L Rev 1105, 1144-46 (1988).
219 Lachman and Polner, Hugh Carey at 156-57 (cited in note 210) (describing the
background behind the famous newspaper headline).
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subsequent enactment of a moratorium law that pressured
bondholders to trade their New York bonds for bonds with lower
payment terms persuaded Ford that New York City had indeed
defaulted and was facing up to its need to restructure.m In late
November 1975, Congress passed and, on December 9, Ford signed
legislation authorizing $2.3 billion in loans to New York over the
next three years. The federal loans essentially implemented the
package outlined in the state's Financial Emergency Act and enabled
New York to avoid a municipal bankruptcy filing."
2. The 2011 Michigan framework.
Michigan's amendments to its municipal-oversight statute are
the most recent, and arguably most sweeping, addition to the
statutory oversight frameworks that a number of states have
adopted.'
The handiwork of a Republican governor and legislature, the
legislation authorizes the "state financial authority," which for a
municipality is the state treasurer, to conduct a preliminary review of
any city or other local government if, among other things, she
concludes that there are "facts or circumstances.., indicative of
municipal financial stress."' If the treasurer's review concludes that
severe financial distress exists, and the governor reaches the same
conclusion, the governor is required to declare that the city is in
receivership. The governor is then instructed to appoint an
emergency manager.' The emergency manager displaces the city's
governing body and other decision makers, and he or she has forty-
five days to create a written financial and operating plan for the
city.' As part of this plan, the emergency manager can reject,
220 See id at 162 (describing the enactment of Moratorium Act); id at 164 (describing the
contentions of the Ford administration "that the Moratorium Act was tantamount to a
declaration of voluntary default, and added that the state and city were jointly facing up to
their years of fiscal responsibility"). The Moratorium Act was struck down as violating the
New York Constitution, but by this time the New York City rescue was in place. See Flushing
National Bank v Municipal Assistance Corp for City of New York, 358 NE2d 848, 851-52 (NY
1976).
221 During the Carter administration, Congress added $1.5 billion in loan guarantees to its
earlier support. Lachman and Polner, Hugh Carey at 187 (cited in note 210).
222 Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act, Mich Comp Laws
§§ 141.1501-141.1531 (2011).
223 Mich Comp Laws § 141.1512(1)(r).
224 Mich Comp Laws § 141.1515(d)(4).
225 Mich Comp Laws §§ 141.1517 to 141.1518.
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modify, or terminate city contracts, including its collective bargaining
agreements. 26
The power to terminate collective bargaining agreements and
other contracts is the framework's most radical intervention. On its
face, this provision seems to violate the Contracts Clause by
authorizing the emergency manager to undo existing contracts, not
just prospective obligations. Anticipating this objection, the
legislation requires that the emergency manager determine that
rejecting the terms of a collective bargaining agreement "is a
legitimate exercise of the state's sovereign [police] powers," because
the "financial emergency.., has created a circumstance in which it is
reasonable and necessary for the state to intercede" and the
adjustments are "reasonable and necessary to deal with a broad,
generalized economic problem."27 Whether these conditions, which
echo the language of the Supreme Court cases, ' can withstand a
Contracts Clause challenge is far from clear. But the powers to
create and implement a written financial and operating plan are less
controversial and nearly as sweeping.2 The question is whether
Congress could borrow aspects of this approach for its dealings with
financially troubled states.
B. Would Federal Oversight Boards Be Constitutional?
The municipal-control board analogy offers two general
strategies that Congress might borrow to help states manage their
financial crisis. Under the ad hoc approach used in New York,
Congress would wait until a crisis emerged before acting and at that
point would legislate as circumstances appeared to dictate. Under
the Michigan strategy, Congress would legislate more generally and
in advance of a specific crisis.' As will already be evident, a
framework modeled on the Michigan approach would essentially be
226 Mich Comp Laws § 141.15190).
227 Mich Comp Laws § 141.1519(k).
228 See, for example, Faitoute, 316 US at 512.
229 Less controversial but hardly uncontroversial. The legislation has already been
challenged as a usurpation of local decision making in contravention of the Michigan state
constitution. See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Brown v Snyder,
No 11-685-CZ (Circuit Court of Ingham County, filed July 2011), online at
http://www.sugarlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2011106/Sugar-Law-Complaint-Brown-v.-Snyder-
PA4.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2011).
230 For this reason, a Michigan-style framework for handling municipal bankruptcy might
be challenged on preemption grounds if it included provisions providing for a vote to
restructure the claims of bonds or other creditors. 11 USC § 903 invalidates such
"composition" provisions in Chapter 9. Whether this Chapter 9 provision would have a
preclusive effect even outside Chapter 9 is not altogether clear. See 11 USC § 903.
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a state-bankruptcy law, which has been my focus throughout the
Article. I therefore will place primary emphasis on the ad hoc, New
York approach in the discussion that follows.
Congress's relationship to the states is different from that of a
state to its municipalities, of course. It is hard to imagine the
Supreme Court upholding a federal analogue to the Michigan
provision that prohibits municipal decision makers from exercising
their governmental authority once an emergency manager has been
appointed, for instance, and authorizes the emergency manager to
devise and implement a financial plan for the municipality. The
affront to state sovereignty would be too direct. As the Court said in
New York v United States: 1 "While Congress has substantial powers
to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern
to the States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer
upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according
to Congress' instructions."'
It is just as clear, however, that Congress has considerable scope
for intervention before it runs up against the state sovereignty
constraints. Congress has for many years partnered with the states
under terms set by Congress on issues such as unemployment
insurance, welfare, and Medicaid. 3 Although these programs do not
explicitly mandate state participation, they impose extensive
constraints on the states that participate, and their financial structure
makes it very difficult for states to opt out. Relying on the same
principles -financial invitation rather than coercion -lawmakers
could adopt either ad hoc, New York-style legislation or a more
general framework.
In practice, particularly with ad hoc intervention, the federal
oversight board would amount to a structured bailout of the troubled
state. In return for federal financing, the state would agree to
restructure its finances under the watchful eye of Congress.
Although Congress could not displace the governor or legislators, it
could condition financing on structural change by the state."4
Congress presumably could survey a proposed budget and determine
whether it was acceptable, for instance, so long as Congress did not
put the budget in place itself. The intervention would be primarily
231 505 US 144 (1992).
232 Id at 162.
233 See generally Roderick M. Hills Jr, The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 Mich L Rev 813 (1998)
(describing and critically assessing federal-state partnerships).
234 See South Dakota v Dole, 483 US 203, 207 (1987).
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forward looking, as the New York intervention was. But it also might
provide for the restructuring of some existing obligations,
particularly if it were framed as an exercise of Congress's
Bankruptcy Clause authority."
In addition to its similarity to Medicaid and welfare, Congress's
role in a federal oversight board would echo another existing
practice: the role of the lender-known as a debtor-in-possession
(DIP) financer - in an ordinary corporate bankruptcy case. DIP
financers often use the terms of their financing agreements to shape
the progression of the case. " Similarly, when the International
Monetary Fund lends money to a financially troubled country, it
nearly always imposes "conditionalities" as a requirement of the
loan."7 A federal oversight board would function in the same way,
providing emergency funding in exchange for structural reform in
the state's finances. Although the issue is not altogether free from
doubt, this approach seems comfortably constitutional.
C. Better Than Bankruptcy?
If a federal oversight board would survive constitutional
challenge, as I believe it would, how does this alternative compare to
bankruptcy? The two mechanisms overlap in some respects. But
there are important distinctions between the two.
Start with funding. As we have seen, to provide the hydraulic
pressure Congress needs without violating state sovereignty, a
federal oversight board would need to link its reforms with rescue
funding. Congress could not simply instruct a state to revamp its
finances, because this would constitute an unconstitutional
commandeering of the state. The federal oversight approach would
therefore require that Congress also commit to rescue funding. It is
unclear how sharply this would differ from a bankruptcy framework
in practice, because it is possible and perhaps likely that the federal
government would provide funding even in bankruptcy, serving as
235 If the legislation specified a particular state, it would not qualify as "uniform" and
would therefore fall outside the Bankruptcy Clause. US Const Art I, § 8, cl 4. Lawmakers
could avoid this difficulty by framing the legislation in general terms, even if it were clearly
aimed at a single state.
236 See Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan L
Rev 751, 784-85 (2002); David A. Skeel Jr, Creditors' Ball: The "New" New Corporate
Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U Pa L Rev 917,923-26 (2003).
237 For a discussion of the IMF's use of conditionalities, see Nouriel Roubini and Brad
Setser, Bailouts or Bail-ins? Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies 305 (Institute
for International Economics 2004). See Factsheet, IMF Conditionality *1-2 (Sept 2011), online at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/conditio.pdf (visited on Nov 25, 2011).
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the DIP financer.' But the scope of any rescue financing may be
lower in bankruptcy. Because there is greater capacity for
restructuring in bankruptcy, the federal funds could be used for
current operating purposes and would be less necessary for debt
service.
The second difference is that a federal oversight board would
carry a greater risk of ad hoc preferences among the state's creditors.
The federal oversight board would be less constrained by formal
priorities and the obligation that similarly situated creditors receive
comparable treatment. If the board appeared to pick winners and
losers, the differential treatment could create market distortions in
future financial crises. " If the brunt of a restructuring were borne by
bondholders, while other creditors were protected, troubled states
might face prohibitive costs in issuing long-term debt, which could
tempt them to rely on short-term borrowing instead. Other benefits
of bankruptcy might also be more difficult to achieve under an ad
hoc approach. The shadow effects would be less pronounced in the
absence of a formal framework, for instance, and the federal
oversight board would be much less likely to clarify entitlements and
help create a coherent priority scheme.
A federal oversight board does, however, have several attractive
qualities as compared with bankruptcy. With a federal oversight
board, Congress-or more precisely, the members of the oversight
board-would be the principal nonstate decision maker. ' In
bankruptcy, by contrast, the judge would play this role. From this
perspective, a federal oversight board could be seen as offering
238 DIP financing is authorized by 11 USC § 364. Although a state might have somewhat
less need for new financing than a corporate debtor, due to taxes and other revenues, some
financing would likely be necessary. This could come either from private lenders or from the
federal government.
239 The Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies were overseen by what amounted to a
federal oversight board in this regard. The terms were dictated by the President and his auto
task force, and the transactions were accomplished through a "sale" rather than the traditional
reorganization process. For the General Motors bankruptcy, see In re General Motors Corp,
407 BR 463, 476-79 (Bankr SDNY 2009). In the Chrysler bankruptcy, the benefits to favored
constituencies may have come at the expense of senior creditors. See Mark J. Roe and David
Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 Mich L Rev 727, 729 (2010).
24 Because municipal-control boards often have direct decision-making authority, the
inclusion of elected officials can raise separation of powers issues. Actions Taken by Five Cities
to Restore Their Financial Health, Subcommittee on the District of Columbia of the Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 17 (Mar 2, 1995) (statement of Jan
B. Montgomery). Because the federal oversight board would not be exercising direct decision-
making authority over the state, this seems less likely to pose constitutional problems. Elected
officials like Governor Hugh Carey (designated as ex officio, along with New York Mayor Abe
Beame and the state comptroller) figured prominently on New York's oversight board in the
1970s. See Bailey, Crisis Regime at 43 (cited in note 210).
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greater democratic legitimacy -at least to the extent its membership
included politically accountable officials.
In addition, a federal oversight board could act much more
quickly than an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding. Because it would
not require the approval either of creditors or of a bankruptcy judge,
the board could operate much more expeditiously.
To fully assess the distinctions between the two approaches, we
need to consider one final factor: the strategic implications of each
for negotiations between state and federal officials in the event a
state threatened to default. If a bankruptcy framework were in place,
and the federal government feared that a state filing would have
spillover effects outside of the state, perhaps unleashing turmoil in
the bond markets, state officials might threaten to file for bankruptcy
unless the federal government provided rescue financing with few or
no strings attached.' Municipalities have sometimes used the threat
bankruptcy as leverage in negotiations for state assistance, although
different factors seem to drive the interactions in different states.24 '
The ad hoc oversight-board approach might be less susceptible to
this gamesmanship. Yet state officials would still have a card to play,
even if there were no bankruptcy framework in place: they could
threaten simply to default if they weren't given a generous federal
funding package. This threat seems as credible as a threat to file for
bankruptcy.
Moreover, the ad hoc approach places intense pressure on
lawmakers' ability to craft a response after the crisis has already
materialized. If Congress failed to put a funds-and-oversight package
in place, either because of an impasse in its negotiations with state
officials or because of resistance within Congress itself, the only
alternative might be an outright default by the state. The contrast
between the New York City crisis of 1975 and more recent
negotiations to avert potentially devastating debt crises is quite
241 See Gillette, 79 U Chi L Rev at 285-86 (cited in note 62). To curb municipalities'
ability to use the threat of bankruptcy to extract concessions from the state, Gillette proposes
that Congress amend Chapter 9 to authorize bankruptcy judges to require the municipality to
raise taxes. Id at 295.
242 See note 162 and accompanying text (describing the strategic use of Chapter 9).
Georgia does not permit its municipalities to file for bankruptcy, see Ga Code Ann § 36-80-5,
for instance, and legislation has recently been enacted in California to make it slightly more
difficult for municipalities to use Chapter 9. Act of Sept 9, 2011, 2011 Cal Stat 675, to be
codified at Cal Gov Code § 53760 et seq. The political dynamics in the two states are very
different, however. The California legislation has been promoted by supporters of public
employee unions who are unhappy about Vallejo's restructuring of its collective bankruptcy
agreements in Chapter 9.
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worrisome in this regard. They underscore the benefits of putting a
restructuring framework in place before a default is imminent.
While these strategic considerations suggest that the bankruptcy
option is preferable to relying on an ad hoc restructuring framework,
it is important to recognize that the use of a federal oversight board
is available as an option if no bankruptcy framework is put in place.
While federal oversight might seem difficult to reconcile with
traditional conceptions of state sovereignty, it is no more intrusive
than the federal mandates that are now ubiquitous in American
regulation.
CONCLUSION
Despite the confident assertions of advocates on both sides of
the state-bankruptcy debate, 3 there are strong and plausible
arguments both for and against. This Article has assessed the six
principal benefits of a state-bankruptcy option and six of the major
objections. Although several of the objections complicate the case
for state bankruptcy, the analysis has suggested that bankruptcy
would significantly improve on the existing strategies for dealing
with a state's financial collapse. The Article also considered a
somewhat analogous alternative, the use of a federal oversight board
modeled on the strategies put in place by a number of states for their
municipalities. Although bankruptcy seems superior overall, the
oversight strategy would offer some of the same benefits as
bankruptcy if Congress failed to enact a bankruptcy law before a
state crisis materialized.
243 A tendency to which I myself have not been immune. See sources cited in note 11.
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